

receive a receipt evidencing the number of units to which he was entitled. The receipts themselves would be non-transferable, but it would be possible for a customer to arrange with Account for the transfer of his units to someone else. A customer could terminate his participation at any time and withdraw the current value of his units.

(i) Section 32 of the Banking Act of 1933 provides in relevant part that:

No officer, director, or employee of any corporation or unincorporated association, no partner or employee of any partnership, and no individual, primarily engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, or other similar securities, shall serve [at] the same time as an officer, director, or employee of any member bank * * *.

(j) The Board concluded, based on its understanding of the proposal and on the general principles that have been developed in respect to the application of section 32, that the bank and Account would constitute a single entity for the purposes of section 32, at least so long as the operation of Account conformed to the representations made by the bank and outlined herein. Accordingly, the Board said that section 32 would not forbid officers of the bank to serve on Account's committee, since Account would be regarded as nothing more than an arm or department of the bank.

(k) In conclusion, the Board called attention to section 21 of the Banking Act of 1933 which, briefly, forbids a securities firm or organization to engage in the business of receiving deposits, subject to certain exceptions. However, since section 21 is a criminal statute, the Board has followed the policy of not expressing views as to its meaning. (1934 Federal Reserve Bulletin 41, 543.) The Board, therefore, expressed no position with respect to whether the section might be held applicable to the establishment and operation of the proposed "Commingled Investment Account."

(12 U.S.C. 248(i))

[30 FR 12836, Oct. 8, 1965. Redesignated at 61 FR 57289, Nov. 6, 1996]

§ 250.411 Interlocking relationships between member bank and variable annuity insurance company.

(a) The Board has recently been asked to consider whether section 32 of the Banking Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C. 78) and this part prohibit interlocking service between member banks and (1) the board of managers of an accumulation fund, registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80), that sells variable annuities and (2) the board of directors of the insurance company, of which the accumulation fund is a "separate account," but as to which the insurance company is the sponsor, investment advisor, underwriter, and distributor. Briefly, a variable annuity is one providing for annuity payment varying in accordance with the changing values of a portfolio of securities.

(b) Section 32 provides in relevant part that:

No officer, director, or employee of any corporation or unincorporated association, no partner or employee of any partnership, and no individual, primarily engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, or other similar securities, shall serve [at] the same time as an officer, director, or employee of any member bank * * *.

(c) For many years, the Board's position has been that an open-end investment company (or mutual fund) is "primarily engaged in the issue * * * public sale, or distribution * * * of securities" since the issuance and sale of its stock is essential to the maintenance of the company's size and to the continuance of its operations without substantial contraction, and that section 32 of the Banking Act of 1933 prohibits an officer, director, or employee of any such company from serving at the same time as an officer, director, or employee of any member bank. (1951 Federal Reserve Bulletin 645; § 218.101.)

(d) For reasons similar to those stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Securities and Exchange Commission v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company of America*, 359 U.S. 65 (1959), the Board concluded that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing a variable annuity interest from a mutual fund share for section 32 purposes and

that, therefore, variable annuity interests should also be regarded as “other similar securities” within the prohibition of the statute and regulation.

(e) The Board concluded also that, since the accumulation fund, like a mutual fund, must continually issue and sell its investment units in order to avoid the inevitable contraction of its activities as it makes annuity payments or redeems variable annuity units, the accumulation fund is “primarily engaged” for section 32 purposes. The Board further concluded that the insurance company was likewise “primarily engaged” for the purposes of the statute since it had no significant revenue producing operations other than as underwriter and distributor of the accumulation fund’s units and investment advisor to the fund.

(f) Although it was clear, therefore, that section 32 prohibits any officers, directors, and employees of member banks from serving in any such capacity with the insurance company or accumulation fund, the Board also considered whether members of the board of managers of the accumulation fund are “officers, directors, or employees” within such prohibition. The functions of the board of managers, who are elected by the variable annuity contract owners, are, with the approval of the variable annuity contract owners, to select annually an independent public accountant, execute annually an agreement providing for investment advisory services, and recommend any changes in the fundamental investment policy of the accumulation fund. In addition, the Board of managers has sole authority to execute an agreement providing for sales and administrative services and to authorize all investments of the assets of the accumulation fund in accordance with its fundamental investment policy. In the opinion of the Board of Governors, the board of managers of the accumulation fund performs functions essentially the same as those performed by classes of persons as to whom the prohibition of section 32 was specifically directed

and, accordingly, are within the prohibitions of the statute.

(12 U.S.C. 248(i))

[33 FR 12886, Sept. 12, 1968. Redesignated at 61 FR 57289, Nov. 6, 1996]

§ 250.412 Interlocking relationships between member bank and insurance company-mutual fund complex.

(a) The Board has been asked whether section 32 of the Banking Act of 1933 and this part prohibited interlocking service between member banks and (1) the advisory board of a newly organized open-end investment company (mutual fund), (2) the fund’s incorporated investment manager-advisor, (3) the insurance company sponsoring and apparently controlling the fund.

(b) X Fund, Inc. (“Fund”), the mutual fund, was closely related to X Life Insurance Company (“Insurance Company”), as well as to the incorporated manager and investment advisor to Fund (“Advisors”), and the corporation serving as underwriter for Fund (“Underwriters”). The same persons served as principal officers and directors of Insurance Company, Fund, Advisors, and Underwriters. In addition, several directors of member banks served as directors of Insurance Company and of Advisors and as members of the Advisory Board of Fund, and additional directors of member banks had been named only as members of the Advisory Board. All outstanding shares of Advisors and of Underwriters were apparently owned by Insurance Company.

(c) Section 32 provides in relevant part that:

No officer, director, or employee of any corporation * * * primarily engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, or other similar securities, shall serve [at] the same time as an officer, director, or employee of any member bank * * *.

(d) The Board of Governors reaffirmed its earlier position that an open-end investment company is “primarily engaged” in activities described in section 32 “even though the shares are sold to the public through independent organizations with the result that the investment company does not