[Federal Register: September 1, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 169)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 53397-53402]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr01se04-30]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
50 CFR Parts 679 and 680
[I.D. 082504A]
RIN 0648-AS47
Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Voluntary
Three-pie Cooperative Program; Allocation of Bering Sea and Aleutian
Islands King and Tanner Crab Fishery Resources
AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Commerce.
ACTION: Notice of availability of amendments to a fishery management
plan; request for comments.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Congress amended the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act
[[Page 53398]]
(Magnuson-Stevens Act) to require the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary)
to approve the Voluntary Three-Pie Cooperative Program (Program). The
Program is necessary to allocate specified Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands
(BSAI) crab resources among harvesters, processors, and coastal
communities. This Program will be implemented by Amendment 18 to the
Fishery Management Plan for BSAI King and Tanner Crabs (FMP).
Additionally, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Council)
has submitted Amendment 19 to the FMP for Secretarial review, which
represents minor changes necessary to implement the Program. This
action is intended to promote the goals and objectives of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act, the FMP, and other applicable laws.
DATES: Comments on the amendments must be submitted on or before
November 1, 2004.
ADDRESSES: Send comments to Sue Salveson, Assistant Regional
Administrator, Sustainable Fisheries Division, Alaska Region, NMFS,
Attn: Lori Durall. Comments may be submitted by:
Mail to P.O. Box 21668, Juneau, AK 99802;
Hand delivery to the Federal Building, 709 West 9th
Street, Room 420A, Juneau, AK;
FAX to 907-586-7557;
E-mail to KTC18-NOA-0648-AS47@noaa.gov. Include in the
subject line of the e-mail the following document identifier: 18 19
NOA. E-mail comments, with or without attachments, are limited to 5
megabytes; or
Webform at the Federal eRulemaking Portal:
http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions at that site for
submitting comments.
Copies of Amendments 18 and 19 and the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) for this action may be obtained from the NMFS Alaska
Region at the address above or from the Alaska Region website at http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/crab/eis/default.htm
.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gretchen Harrington, 907-586-7228 or
gretchen.harrington@noaa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Magnuson-Stevens Act requires that each
regional fishery management council submit any FMP amendment it
prepares to NMFS for review and approval, disapproval, or partial
approval by the Secretary. The Magnuson-Stevens Act also requires that
NMFS, upon receiving an FMP amendment, immediately publish a notice in
the Federal Register announcing that the amendment is available for
public review and comment.
In January 2004, the U.S. Congress amended section 313 of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act through the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-199, section 801), by adding paragraph (j). As
amended, section 313(j)(1) requires the Secretary to approve, by
January 1, 2005, the Voluntary Three-Pie Cooperative Program (Program),
as it was approved by the Council between June 2002 and April 2003, and
all trailing amendments, including those reported to Congress on May 6,
2003. The Program allocates BSAI crab resources among harvesters,
processors, and coastal community interests. The Program, as it will be
implemented by Amendments 18 and 19 to the FMP, is described below.
Voluntary Three-Pie Cooperative Program - Amendment 18
The Council developed the Program over a 6-year period to fit the
specific dynamics and needs of the BSAI crab fisheries. The Program is
a limited access system that balances the interests of several groups
that depend on these fisheries. The Program will address conservation
and management issues associated with the current derby fishery and
will reduce bycatch and associated discard mortality. The Program is
also designed to improve the safety of crab fishermen by ending the
race for fish. Share allocations to harvesters and processors, together
with incentives to participate in fishery cooperatives, are intended to
increase efficiencies, provide economic stability, and facilitate
compensated reduction of excess capacities in the harvesting and
processing sectors. Community interests are protected by Community
Development Quota (CDQ) allocations and regional landing and processing
requirements, as well as by several community protection measures.
The Program encompasses the following BSAI crab fisheries: Bristol
Bay red king crab (Paralithodes camtschaticus), Western Aleutian
Islands (Adak) golden king crab (Lithodes aequispinus) - West of
174[deg] W., Eastern Aleutian Islands (Dutch Harbor) golden king crab -
East of 174[deg] W., Western Aleutian Islands (Adak) red king crab -
West of 179[deg] W., Pribilof Islands blue king crab (P. platypus) and
red king crab, St. Matthew Island blue king crab, Bering Sea snow crab
(Chionoecetes opilio), and Bering Sea Tanner crab (C. bairdi). In this
document, the phrase ``crab fisheries'' refers to these fisheries,
unless otherwise specified.
Harvest Sector
Qualified harvesters would be allocated quota share (QS) in each
crab fishery. To receive a QS allocation, a harvester must hold a
valid, permanent, fully transferable license limitation program (LLP)
license endorsed for that crab fishery. Quota share represents an
exclusive but revokable privilege that provides the QS holder with an
annual allocation to harvest a specific percentage of the total
allowable catch (TAC) from a fishery. The annual allocations of TACs,
in pounds, are referred to as individual fishing quotas (IFQs). Using
LLP licenses for defining eligibility in the Program would maintain
current fishery participation. A harvester's allocation of QS for a
fishery would be based on the landings made by his or her vessel in
that fishery. Specifically, each allocation is the harvester's average
annual portion of the total qualified catch during a specific
qualifying period. Qualifying periods were selected to balance
historical and recent participation. Different periods were selected
for different fisheries to accommodate closures and other circumstances
in the fisheries in recent years.
Quota share would be designated as either catcher vessel (CV)
shares or catcher/processor (C/P) shares, depending on whether the
vessel processed the qualifying harvests on board. In addition, catcher
vessel QS would be designated by landing region. Catcher vessel IFQ
would be issued in two classes. Crabs harvested with class A IFQ would
require delivery to a processor holding unused processing quota. Class
A IFQ harvests also would be subject to a regional delivery
requirement. Under this regional requirement, harvests would be
delivered either in a North or in a South region (in most fisheries).
Crabs harvested with class B IFQ could be delivered to any processor
(except C/Ps operating as C/Ps) and would not be regionally designated.
Harvests in excess of IFQ would be forfeited in all cases. Class B IFQs
are intended to provide ex-vessel price negotiating leverage to
harvesters. For each region of each fishery, the allocation of Class B
IFQ would be 10 percent of the total allocation of IFQ to the CV
sector.
Transfer of quota share and IFQ , either by sale or lease, would be
allowed, subject to limits including caps on the amount of shares a
person may hold or use. Leasing would mean the use of IFQs on a vessel
in which the holder of the underlying QS holds less
[[Page 53399]]
than a 10 percent ownership interest or on which the underlying QS
holder is not present. To be eligible to receive transferred QS or IFQ,
a person would be required to be a U.S. citizen with at least 150 days
of sea time in any U.S. commercial fishery. A corporate entity would be
eligible to receive transferred QS or IFQ only if it were at least 20
percent owned by a U.S. citizen with at least 150 days of sea time in
any U.S. commercial fishery. Initial recipients of QS, CDQ groups, and
community entities would be exempt from these transfer eligibility
criteria.
Separate caps would be imposed to limit the amount of QS and IFQs a
person could hold and to limit the use of IFQs onboard a vessel. These
caps are intended to prevent negative impacts from what can be
described as excessive consolidation of shares. Excessive share
holdings are prohibited by the Magnuson-Stevens Act. Different caps are
chosen for the different fisheries because fleet characteristics and
dependence differ across fisheries. Separate caps on QS holdings are
established for CDQ groups, which represent rural western Alaska
communities. Processor holdings of harvest shares would also be limited
by caps on vertical integration. Quota share holders could retain and
use initial allocations of QS above the caps.
Captains Shares (C Shares)
To protect their interests in the fisheries, qualifying captains
would be allocated 3 percent of the qualifying catch history as C
shares. These shares are intended to provide long term benefits to
captains and crew. The allocation to captains would be based on the
same qualifying years and computational method used for quota share
allocations to LLP holders. To ensure that C shares benefit at-sea
participants in the fisheries, the IFQ derived from C shares could be
used only when the C share holder is on board the vessel.
To be eligible to receive an allocation, an individual would be
required to have historic and recent participation. Historic
participation would be demonstrated by at least one landing in each of
three of the qualifying years. Recent participation would be
demonstrated by at least one landing in two of the three most recent
seasons before June 10, 2002, except for the fisheries that were closed
in this period. For these fisheries (Adak red king crab, the Pribilof
Islands red and blue king crab, the St. Matthew Island blue king crab,
and the Tanner crab fisheries), recent participation would be
demonstrated by at least one landing in two of the three most recent
seasons preceding June 10, 2002, in the snow crab, Bristol Bay red king
crab, or one of the Aleutian Islands golden king crab fisheries. The
recent participation requirement would be waived for captains who died
in fishing-related incidents if the captain's estate applies for QS.
C shares would be required to be delivered to shore-based or
floating processors for processing. During the first 3 years a fishery
is open after implementation, C shares would not be subject to specific
delivery requirements. After 3 years, C shares would be subject to the
Class A IFQ/Class B IFQ distinction with commensurate regional delivery
requirements unless the Council determines, after review, not to apply
those designations.
To be eligible to receive transferred C shares, a person would be
required to be a U.S. citizen with at least 150 days sea time in a U.S.
commercial fishery in a harvest capacity. In addition, the person would
be required to be an ``active participant'' in the BSAI crab fisheries,
demonstrated by a landing in a crab fishery during the 365 days before
the transfer application. Evidence of participation could be either a
State of Alaska fish ticket, an affidavit from the vessel owner, or
other verifiable evidence.
Leasing of C shares in each fishery would be permitted in the first
three seasons a fishery is prosecuted after implementation of the
Program. After the first three seasons the fishery is prosecuted,
leasing would be permitted only in the case of a documented hardship
(such as a medical hardship or loss of vessel) for the term of the
hardship, subject to a maximum of 2 years over a 10-year period.
Individual C share use and holdings would be capped at the same
level as the vessel use caps applicable to QS. Initial allocations of C
shares in excess of the cap could be retained. C shares would not be
considered in determining a vessel's compliance with the vessel use
caps on QS. Landings with C shares would be subject to the IFQ fee
program.
C/P captains would be allocated C/P C shares that include a
harvesting and on-board processing privilege. Harvests with C/P C
shares also could be delivered to shore-based or floating processors.
Processing Sector
A processing privilege, analogous to the harvesting privilege
allocated to harvesters, would be allocated to processors. Qualified
processors would be allocated processor quota share (PQS) in each crab
fishery. PQS represent an exclusive but revocable privilege to receive
deliveries of a specific portion of the annual TAC from a fishery. An
annual allocation of PQS is referred to as IPQ and expressed in pounds
of crab. IPQs would be issued for 90 percent of the allocated harvests,
corresponding to the 90-percent allocation of Class A IFQ. Processor
privileges would not apply to the remaining 10 percent of the TAC
allocated as Class B IFQ. IPQs would be regionally designated for
processing in a North or a South region (corresponding to the regional
designation of the Class A IFQ).
PQS allocations would be based on processing history during a
specified qualifying period for each fishery. A processor's allocation
in a fishery would equal its share of all qualified pounds of crab
processed in the qualifying period (i.e., pounds processed by the
processor divided by pounds processed by all qualified processors).
Processor shares would be transferable, including the leasing of IPQs
and the sale of PQS, subject to caps and to community protection
measures. IPQs could be used without transfer at any facility or plant
operated by a processor. New processors could enter the fishery by
purchasing PQS or IPQ or by purchasing crab harvested with Class B IFQ
or crab harvested by CDQ groups.
Processors would be limited to holding 30 percent of the PQS issued
for a fishery, except that initial allocations of shares above this
limit could be retained and used. In addition, in the snow crab
fishery, no processor would be permitted to use or hold in excess of 60
percent of the IPQs issued for the Northern region.
Catcher/Processors
C/Ps have a unique position in the Program because they participate
in both the harvest and processing sectors. Persons who caught and
processed crab on the same vessel would be allocated C/P QS. These
shares would represent a harvest privilege and an on-board processing
privilege. To be eligible for C/P shares, a person would be required to
hold a permanent fully transferable C/P LLP license. In addition, a
person must have processed crab on board the C/P in either 1998 or
1999. Persons meeting these qualification requirements would be
allocated C/P QS in accordance with the allocation rules for harvest
shares for all qualified catch that was processed on board. Catcher/
Processor QS would not have regional designations.
[[Page 53400]]
Regionalization
The regional designation of QS is intended to preserve the historic
geographic distribution of landings in the fisheries. Communities in
the Pribilof Islands are the prime beneficiaries of this
regionalization provision. Two regional designations would be created
in most fisheries. The North region would be all areas in the Bering
Sea north of 56[deg]20' N latitude. The South region would be all other
areas. Catcher vessel QS, Class A IFQ, PQS, and IPQ would be regionally
designated. Crab harvested with regionally designated IFQ would be
required to be delivered to a processor in the designated region.
Likewise, a processor with regionally designated shares would be
required to accept delivery of and process crab in the designated
region. Catcher vessel QS and PQS would be designated based on the
location of the activity that gave rise to the allocation. For example,
qualified catch delivered in a region would result in CV QS designated
for that region.
The Program has two exceptions to the North/South regional
designations. In the western Aleutian Islands (Adak) golden king crab
fishery, 50 percent of the CV QS and PQS would be designated as western
shares to be delivered west of 174[deg] W. longitude. The remaining 50
percent of the Class A IFQ allocation would have no regional
designation and would not be subject to a regional delivery
requirement. This designation would be applied to all allocations
regardless of the historic location of landings in the fishery. A
second exception is the Bering Sea Tanner crab fishery, which would
have no regional designation. This fishery is anticipated to be
conducted primarily as a concurrent fishery with the regionalized
Bristol Bay red king crab and Bering Sea snow crab fisheries, making
the regional designation of Tanner crab landings unnecessary.
Cooperatives
Harvesters may form voluntary cooperatives associated with one or
more processors holding PQS. A minimum membership of four unique CV QS
holders would be required for cooperative formation. The cooperative
would receive the sum of the annual IFQ allocations of its members in
the applicable crab fisheries. A cooperative would be required to
submit annually a cooperative agreement to NMFS before NMFS would set
aside the cooperative's IFQ allocation for its exclusive use.
Cooperative members would be allowed to leave a cooperative at any time
after one season. Departing members would retain their QS, but a
departing member's IFQ would remain with the cooperative for the
duration of the cooperative's IFQ permit. Vessels on which cooperative
shares were fished would not be subject to use caps. IFQ could also be
transferred between cooperatives, subject to NMFS' approval.
Only processors that hold IPQ could associate with a cooperative.
Processors that associate with cooperatives would not be members of the
cooperatives but would remain independent. A cooperative would not be
bound to deliver its harvests to an associated processor, provided that
the cooperative complies with the delivery requirements associated with
the harvest and processing shares. Processors that do not hold IPQ
would not be able to associate with a cooperative.
Binding Arbitration
BSAI crab fisheries have a history of contentious price
negotiations. Harvesters have often acted collectively to negotiate an
ex-vessel price with processors, at times delaying fishing to pressure
price concessions from processors. Participants in both sectors are
interested in ending that practice, but are concerned that market power
could be altered by the rationalization of the fisheries. The Program
would create a system with a one-to-one relationship of harvest and
processing shares that would limit the pool of persons with whom a QS
holder may transact. The concern is most acute for the last QS holders
from each sector to commit their shares because of the one-to-one
relationship of IPQ to Class A IFQ. The last Class A IFQ holder to
contract deliveries will have a single IPQ holder to contract with,
effectively limiting any ability to use other processor markets for
negotiating leverage. To ensure fair price negotiations, the Program
includes a provision for binding arbitration to resolve price disputes
between harvesters and processors.
The system of binding arbitration would apply to IPQ, Class A IFQ,
and C shares when those shares are subject to IPQ landing requirements.
Under the system, the arbitrator would establish a finding that
preserves the historic division of revenues while considering other
relevant factors, including current ex-vessel prices, location and
timing of deliveries, and vessel safety.
The arbitration process would begin pre-season with a market report
for each fishery prepared by an independent market analyst and the
establishment of a non-binding fleet wide benchmark price by an
arbitrator who has consulted with both fleet representatives and
processors. Information provided by the sectors would be historical in
nature. In determining this benchmark price, the arbitrator would
consider the highest arbitrated price that applied to at least 7
percent of the IPQ in the fishery in the preceding year. This non-
binding price is intended to help guide price negotiations and inform
later arbitration proceedings. After a negotiating period, a Class A
IFQ holder could initiate a single arbitration proceeding with one or
more IPQ holders before the fishing season. Proceedings may be
initiated by one or more IFQ holders prior to the season after
committing to deliver crab to the IPQ holder. For a brief period of
time prior to the commencement of hearings, an IFQ holder could join
the proceeding by unilaterally committing deliveries to the IPQ holder.
The arbitration would be in a last best (or final) offer format.
The IPQ holder would submit a single offer. Each IFQ holder could
submit an offer, or a cooperative could submit a collective offer. For
each IFQ holder or cooperative, the arbitrator would select between the
IFQ holder's (or cooperative's) offer and the IPQ holder's offer. An
IFQ holder with uncommited IFQ may opt-in to any contract that results
from a competitive arbitration by accepting all terms of the
arbitration decision (assuming that the IPQ holder held adequate shares
to accept the deliveries).
Community Protection Measures
The Program includes several provisions intended to protect
communities from adverse impacts that could result from the Program.
Communities would be defined as boroughs, if an organized borough
exists, or as first or second class cities, if no organized borough
exists. Communities eligible for the community protection measures
would be those with 3 percent or more of the qualified landings in any
crab fishery included in the Program. Based on these criteria, NMFS has
preliminarily determined that the eligible crab communities are as
follows: Adak, Akutan, Dutch Harbor, Kodiak, King Cove, False Pass, St.
George, St. Paul, and Port Moeller.
``Cooling off'' provision. During the first two years of fishing
under the Program, any PQS based on processing history from an eligible
community could not be transferred from that community.
``Cooling off'' provision exemptions. Three exemptions exist to the
cooling off provision. Tanner crab PQS would be exempt from the
``cooling off'' provision because that fishery is
[[Page 53401]]
expected to be a concurrent fishery with the Bristol Bay red king crab
and snow crab fisheries. Western Aleutian Islands red king crab PQS
would also be exempt from the ``cooling off'' provision because that
fishery was closed for several years leading up to development of the
Program. Western Aleutian Islands golden king crab PQS would also be
exempt from the ``cooling off'' provision because the West
regionalization landing requirements are inconsistent with the historic
distribution of landings that would be established by the ``cooling
off'' provision.
Individual processing quota caps. IPQ caps would be established to
limit the annual issuance of IPQs in seasons when the TAC exceeds a
threshold amount. When the Bristol Bay red king crab TAC is greater
than 20 million pounds, IPQs would not be issued for the amount of the
TAC in excess of 20 million pounds. When the snow crab TAC is greater
than 175 million pounds, IPQs would not be issued for the amount of the
TAC in excess of 175 million pounds. Under these circumstances, Class A
IFQ issued in excess of these thresholds would not be subject to the
IPQ landing requirements but would be subject to the regional landing
requirements.
Sea time waiver. Sea time eligibility requirements for the purchase
of QS would be waived for CDQ groups and community entities in eligible
communities, allowing those communities to build and maintain local
interests in harvesting. CDQ groups and community entities would be
eligible to purchase PQS. CDQ groups and community entities would not
be permitted to purchase C shares.
Right of first refusal for processor quota share. Eligible
communities would have a right of first refusal on the transfer of PQS
and IPQ originating from processing history in the community if the
transfer would result in relocation of the shares outside the
community. Adak would not be eligible for the right of first refusal
provision because Adak would receive a direct allocation of western
Aleutian Islands golden king crab. The right of first refusal would be
granted to CDQ groups in CDQ communities. In addition, eligible
communities in the Gulf of Alaska (GOA) north of 56[deg]20' would have
a right of first refusal on the transfer of PQS and IPQ from
communities in the GOA with less than 3 percent of the qualified
landings in any crab fishery included in the Program.
Community Development Quota Program and Community Allocations
Community development quota program. The CDQ program would be
broadened to include the eastern Aleutian Islands golden king crab
fishery and the western Aleutian Islands red king crab fishery. In
addition, the CDQ allocations in all crab fisheries covered by the
Program would be increased from 7.5 to 10 percent of the TAC. The
increase would not apply in the Norton Sound crab fisheries, which are
excluded from the Program. CDQ groups would be required to deliver at
least 25 percent of their allocation to shore based processors. The CDQ
allocations would be managed independently from the Program and would
not be subject to the Program's share designations and landing
requirements.
Community purchase. Any non-CDQ community in which 3 percent or
more of any crab fishery was processed could form a non-profit entity
to receive QS, IFQ, PQ and IPQ transfers on behalf of the community.
Adak allocation. An allocation of 10 percent of the TAC of western
Aleutian Islands golden king crab fishery would be made to the
community of Adak. The allocation to Adak would be made to a nonprofit
entity representing the community, with a board of directors elected by
the community. Oversight of the use of the allocation for ``fisheries
related purposes'' would be deferred to the State of Alaska under the
FMP. NMFS would have no direct role in oversight of the use of this
allocation. The State of Alaska would provide an implementation review
to the Council to ensure that the benefits derived from the allocation
accrue to the community and achieve the goals of the fisheries
development plan. This allocation would not be part of the crab IFQ
fisheries, but would be managed as a separate commercial fishery by the
State of Alaska in a manner similar to management of the crab CDQ
fisheries.
Crew Loan Program
To aid captains and crew in purchasing QS, a low interest loan
program (similar to the loan program under the halibut and sablefish
IFQ program) would be created. This program would be funded by 25
percent of the cost recovery fees required by section 304 of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act. Loan money would be accessible only to active
participants and could be used to purchase either C shares or QS. Quota
share purchased with loan money would be subject to all use and leasing
restrictions applicable to C shares for the term of the loan.
Protections for Participants in Other Fisheries
The Program would affect the fishing patterns of current
participants and could allow BSAI crab fishermen to increase
participation in other fisheries. To protect participants in GOA
groundfish fisheries, restrictions would apply to vessels that
participate in the snow crab fishery. The restrictions, also called
sideboards, would restrict a vessel's harvests to its historic harvests
in all GOA groundfish fisheries (except the sablefish fishery). Vessels
with less than 100,000 pounds of total snow crab harvests and more than
500 metric tons (mt) of total Pacific cod harvests in the GOA during
the qualifying years would be exempt from the restrictions. In
addition, vessels with less than 50 mt of total groundfish landings in
the GOA during the qualifying period would be prohibited from
harvesting Pacific cod from the GOA. Restrictions would be applied to
vessels but also would restrict harvests made using a groundfish LLP
license derived from the history of a vessel so restricted, even if
that LLP license is used on another vessel.
Additional Program Elements
Annual reports and Program review. NMFS, in conjunction with the
State of Alaska, would produce annual reports on the Program. Eighteen
months after implementation of the Program, the Council would review
the processor quota share and binding arbitration components. After 3
years, the Council would conduct a preliminary review of the Program. A
full review of the Program would be undertaken at the first Council
meeting in the fifth year after implementation. These reviews are
intended to objectively measure the success of the Program in achieving
the goals and objectives specified in the Council's problem statement
and the Magnuson-Stevens Act standards. These reviews would examine the
impacts of the Program on vessel owners, captains, crew, processors,
and communities, and include an assessment of options to mitigate
negative impacts. Additional reviews would be conducted every 5 years.
Data collection. The Program includes a comprehensive socio-
economic data collection program to aid the Council and NMFS in
assessing the success of the Program and developing amendments
necessary to mitigate any unintended consequences. Cost, revenue,
ownership, and employment data would be collected regularly from
[[Page 53402]]
the harvesting and processing sectors. The data would be used to study
the economic and social impacts of the Program on harvesters,
processors, and communities. Participation in the data collection
program would be mandatory for all participants in the fisheries.
Monitoring and enforcement. NMFS and the State of Alaska would
coordinate monitoring and enforcement of this Program. Harvesting and
processing activity would need to be monitored for compliance with the
implementing regulations. Methods for catch accounting and catch
monitoring plans for cooperatives would generate data to provide
accurate and reliable estimates of the total catch and landings to
manage quota share accounts, prevent overages of IFQ and IPQ, and
determine regionalization requirements. Monitoring would include landed
catch weight and species composition, bycatch, and deadloss to estimate
total fishery removals.
Cost Recovery. NMFS would establish a cost recovery fee system,
required by section 304(d)(2) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, to recover
actual costs directly related to the management and enforcement of the
Program. The crab cost recovery fee would be paid in equal shares by
the harvesting and processing sectors and would be based on the ex-
vessel value of all crab harvested under the Program, including CDQ
crab and Adak crab. NMFS also would enter into a cooperative agreement
with the State of Alaska to use IFQ cost recovery funds in State
management and observer programs for BSAI crab fisheries. The crab cost
recovery fee is prohibited from exceeding 3 percent of the annual ex-
vessel value. However, the collection of up to 133 percent of the
actual costs of management and enforcement under the Program would be
authorized, which would provide for up to 100 percent of management
costs after allocation of 25 percent of the cost recovery fees to the
loan program.
Amendment 19
The amended Magnuson-Stevens Act provides the Council the authority
to recommend to the Secretary subsequent amendments to the Program and
provides the Secretary with the discretion to approve these amendments
by January 1, 2005. In June 2004, the Council reviewed the public
comments received on the Draft EIS and determined that changes to the
Program were warranted. The Council recommended changes to three
components of the Program: binding arbitration, cooperative sideboard
management, and program review. These changes are contained in
Amendment 19 to the FMP.
The first change would limit information sharing among participants
involved in binding arbitration to minimize the exposure of these
participants to antitrust liability. The second change would remove a
provision that directs cooperatives to limit their aggregate Pacific
cod catch in both federal and state waters because this provision is
not practical or enforceable. Thus, groundfish sideboards in the GOA
would be managed by NMFS through fleet-wide sideboard directed fishing
closures for federal waters and the parallel fishery in state waters.
The Council also directed its staff to prepare an analysis of
captain share (C share) landings for consideration by the Council 18
months after fishing begins under the Program. The purpose of the
analysis is to examine landings patterns of C shares to determine
whether the distribution of landings among processors and communities
of C shares differs from the distribution of landings of the general
harvest share pool. After receiving the analysis, the Council will
consider whether to remove the 90/10 Class A/Class B split from C
shares, which is scheduled to take effect 3 years after fishing under
the Program begins.
An EIS was prepared for Amendments 18 and 19 that describes the
management background, the purpose and need for action, the management
alternatives, and the environmental and socio-economic impacts of the
alternatives (see ADDRESSES). The EIS contains as appendices the
Regulatory Impact Review/Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis and
the Social Impact Assessment prepared for this action.
Public comments are being solicited on proposed Amendments 18 and
19 through the end of the comment period stated (see DATES). All
comments received by the end of the comment period on the amendments
will be considered in the approval/disapproval decision. Comments
received after that date will not be considered in the approval/
disapproval decision on the amendments. To be considered, comments must
be received not just postmarked or otherwise transmitted by the close
of business on the last day of the comment period. NMFS will publish
the proposed regulations to implement Amendments 18 and 19 in October
2004.
Dated: August 26, 2004.
Allen D. Risenhoover,
Acting Director, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, National Marine
Fisheries Service.
[FR Doc. 04-19971 Filed 8-31-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-22-S