[Federal Register: December 20, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 244)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 72521-72562]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr20de07-29]
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Part III
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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10 CFR Parts 60, 63, 73 and 74
Geologic Repository Operations Area Security and Material Control and
Accounting Requirements; Proposed Rule
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 60, 63, 73, and 74
RIN 3150-AI06
Geologic Repository Operations Area Security and Material Control
and Accounting Requirements
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend
its regulations to revise the security requirements and material
control and accounting (MC&A) requirements for a geologic repository
operations area (GROA). The goal of this rulemaking is to ensure that
effective security measures are in place for the protection of high-
level radioactive waste (HLW) and other radioactive material at a GROA
given the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment. New requirements
for specific training enhancements, improved access authorization,
enhancements to defensive strategies, and enhanced reporting
requirements would be incorporated. The proposed rule would establish
general performance objectives and corresponding system capabilities
for the GROA MC&A program, with a focus on strengthening, streamlining,
and consolidating all MC&A regulations specific to a GROA. In addition,
the proposed rule would require the emergency plan to address
radiological emergencies.
DATES: The comment period expires March 4, 2008. Comments received
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the
NRC is able to assure consideration only for comments received on or
before this date.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods.
Please include the number RIN 3150-AI06 in the subject line of your
comments. Comments on rulemakings submitted in writing or in electronic
form will be made available to the public in their entirety on the NRC
rulemaking Web site. Personal information such as name, address,
telephone, e-mail address, etc., will not be removed from your
submission.
Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
E-mail comments to: SECY@nrc.gov. If you do not receive a reply e-
mail confirming that we have received your comments, contact us
directly at (301) 415-1677.
Comments can also be submitted via the Federal eRulemaking Portal
http://www.regulations.gov.
Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland
20852, between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm Federal workdays. (Telephone (301)
415-1677).
Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at
(301) 415-1101.
Publicly available documents related to this rulemaking, including
comments, may be viewed electronically on the public computers located
at the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR), O1 F21, One White Flint North,
11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The PDR reproduction
contractor will copy documents for a fee.
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after
November 1, 1999, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic
Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this
site, the public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide Document
Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image
files of NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or
if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS,
contact the NRC PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Merri Horn, Office of Federal and
State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-
8126, e-mail, mlh1@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
II. Discussion
A. What Action Is the NRC Taking?
B. Whom Would This Action Affect?
C. Why Do the Requirements Need to be Revised?
D. When Do the Security and MC&A Plans Need To Be Submitted?
E. What Types of Material Would Be Covered by the New Security
and MC&A Requirements?
F. What Are the Key Aspects of the Proposed MC&A Requirements?
G. What Kinds of Systems Capabilities Would Be Proposed for the
MC&A Program?
H. Would Shipper-Receiver Comparisons With Independent
Measurements Be Required for Receipts?
I. What Measurements Would Be Necessary Under the GROA MC&A
Program?
J. What Would an MC&A Detection and Response Program Involve?
K. What Additional Requirements Would Be Imposed if DOE
Possesses Formula Quantities of Strategic SNM That Is in a Form
Other Than as Irradiated Nuclear Reactor Fuel?
L. What Special MC&A-Related Needs Exist?
M. What Is the Objective of the Proposed Physical Security
Requirements?
N. What Threat Would a GROA Be Required To Defend Against?
O. Why Do the Security Requirements Differ for Various Aspects
of a GROA?
P. Would Access Authorization Requirements Apply to a GROA and
What Would They Cover?
Q. Would Criminal History Checks Apply to a GROA?
R. What Are the Key Aspects of the Security Requirements?
S. What Is a Target Set as it Applies to a GROA?
T. What Weapons Authorization Would Be Necessary for the GROA
Operations?
U. Would DOE Be Required To Conduct Force-on-Force Exercises for
the GROA Facility?
V. How Would the Security Plans Handle Construction at a GROA
After Receipt of HLW Begins?
W. Does This Rulemaking Cover Transportation of High-Level
Radioactive Waste to a GROA?
X. Would the Security and MC&A Plans Cover Postclosure?
Y. What Safeguards Reporting Requirements Would Be Proposed for
a GROA?
Z. Does the NRC Plan To Issue Guidance Documents?
AA. Would the GROA Facilities Be Subject to IAEA Safeguards?
BB. What Changes Would Be Made to the Emergency Plan
Requirements?
CC. What Should I Consider as I Prepare My Comments to NRC?
III. Discussion of Proposed Amendments by Section
IV. Criminal Penalties
V. Agreement State Compatibility
VI. Plain Language
VII. Voluntary Consensus Standards
VIII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact
IX. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
X. Public Protection Notification
XI. Regulatory Analysis
XII. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
XIII. Backfit Analysis
I. Background
On November 2, 2001 (66 FR 55732), the NRC published its final rule
governing disposal of HLW in a potential geologic repository at Yucca
Mountain in Nevada. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) must comply
with these regulations for NRC to authorize construction and license
operation of a potential repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. The
security requirements applicable to a GROA in these regulations were
developed prior to September 11, 2001, under a previous and very
different
[[Page 72523]]
threat environment. Currently, there is no distinction between the
security and MC&A requirements for independent spent fuel storage
installations (ISFSIs) and the requirements for larger, more
complicated geologic repositories for permanent disposal of HLW. At the
time the security provisions were established, the NRC used the same
regulatory approach for protecting a GROA as that for protecting spent
nuclear fuel storage facilities licensed under 10 CFR part 72. GROA
operations, at least those conducted in surface facilities, seemed
vulnerable to the same kinds of potential threats that were
characteristic of the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). The same
level of protection was deemed sufficient to protect against acts that
might be inimical to the common defense and security. The same
reasoning applies to the MC&A requirements.
The NRC's regulatory approach was predicated on maintaining the
physical integrity of the SNF rods. In the event the physical integrity
of the SNF rods could not be maintained, the staff planned to address
the additional security measures that would be necessary by
incorporating conditions into the license.
Potential surface operations at a GROA have become more complex
over the years. For example, the DOE has indicated that it now plans to
include bare SNF handling operations within a spent fuel pool to
transfer SNF from a non-TAD (transfer, aging, disposal) canister to a
TAD canister, which would then be utilized for emplacement and
permanent disposal of the SNF in the Yucca Mountain repository.
Because both the threat environment and the plans for surface
operations at the GROA have changed, the NRC now believes that a
separate regulatory approach for protecting and safeguarding a GROA is
necessary. The DOE has not set forth a final concept of operations for
the GROA. Therefore, it is not clear what types of facilities will be
part of the surface operations or what type of handling of the HLW
within the surface facilities may occur.
The new security and MC&A requirements also should be broad enough
and sufficiently flexible to cover a range of possible types of non-HLW
radioactive materials without the need for additional rulemaking. The
DOE, in its Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for a geologic
repository at Yucca Mountain, considered the possibility that
radioactive waste types other than SNF and HLW, such as Greater-Than-
Class-C low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and Special-Performance-
Assessment-Required LLW might be disposed of in a geologic repository.
See Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for
the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at
Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada, February 2002, Vol. II, A-1, A-57-
A-64. Disposal of such non-HLW could require new legislation or a
determination by the NRC that these wastes require permanent isolation.
The NRC is not making such a determination in this rulemaking. However,
the security and MC&A requirements being proposed for a GROA take
account of the possibility that the geologic repository might be used
for the disposal of radioactive materials which are not SNF or HLW.
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC
conducted a thorough review of its security requirements to ensure that
special nuclear material (SNM) at fixed sites and in transit continued
to have effective security measures in place given the changing threat
environment. Through a series of security orders issued to certain NRC
licensees, the Commission specified changes to the Design Basis Threat
(DBT) for power reactor and Category I Strategic SNM licensees, and
implemented enhanced requirements for specific training, access
authorization, defensive strategies, and security. Through generic
communications, the Commission specified expectations about enhanced
notifications to the NRC for certain security events or suspicious
activities. These enhancements resulted in some licensees revising
their physical security plans, security personnel training and
qualification plans, and safeguards contingency plans to defend against
the supplemental DBT requirements. These security orders specifically
required certain licensees to: (1) Increase patrols; (2) augment the
security force capabilities and security posts; (3) add and modify
existing physical security barriers; (4) move vehicle check points to a
greater standoff distance; (5) enhance coordination with local law
enforcement agency (LLEA) and military authorities; (6) augment their
security and emergency response training, equipment, and
communications; and (7) strengthen off-site access controls, including
additional background and screening checks of employees. The enhanced
security measures have yet to be imposed on a GROA. This rulemaking is
the mechanism the NRC is using to impose the new requirements on the
DOE for operations at a GROA.
This rulemaking to upgrade the requirements for physical protection
of HLW and other radioactive materials at a GROA combines lessons
learned, current/best practices, and requirements based on those
contained in security orders issued to NRC licensees that address the
post-September 11, 2001, threat environment. The security orders, as
well as other ongoing security rulemakings, are used as the basis for
upgrading the GROA security requirements. Specifically, the security
requirements for power reactors are being used as the starting point
for the security requirements for this proposed rule. The reactor
requirements are used as the stating point because of the similarity in
material, the material's attractiveness for malevolent use, and the
potential consequences of its malevolent use. The security requirements
should provide protection equivalent to a power reactor. The reactor
requirements have been proposed in a rule entitled ``Power Reactor
Security Requirements'' (71 FR 62664; October 26, 2006).
Section 653 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct), signed into
law on August 8, 2005, allows the NRC to authorize licensees to use, as
part of their protective strategies, an expanded arsenal of weapons,
including machine guns and semi-automatic assault weapons. Section 653
requires that all security personnel with access to any weapons undergo
a background check that includes fingerprinting and a check against the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) National Instant Criminal
Background Check System (NICS) database. Under Section 161k. of the
Atomic Energy Act (AEA), as amended, the DOE has authority for
authorization of weapons. The NRC does not plan to use its authority
under Section 653 of the EPAct. The DOE, under its own authority under
Section 161k. of the AEA, may authorize the use of an expanded weapons
arsenal and the use of force in accordance with the requirements of 10
CFR part 1047.
The goal of this rulemaking is to ensure that effective security
measures are in place for the protection of HLW and other radioactive
materials given the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment. New
requirements for specific training enhancements, improved access
authorization, and enhancements to defensive strategies would be
incorporated. The proposed rule would establish general performance
objectives and corresponding system capabilities for the GROA MC&A
program, with a focus on strengthening, streamlining, and consolidating
into 10 CFR Part 74 all MC&A regulations specific to a GROA. In
addition, the proposed rule would
[[Page 72524]]
require the emergency plan to address radiological emergencies.
II. Discussion
A. What Action Is the NRC Taking?
The NRC is proposing to amend its regulations primarily to
establish new physical security and MC&A requirements for HLW and other
radioactive materials at a GROA. The requirements specified in this
rulemaking would establish the objectives and minimum performance
standards that the DOE must meet to protect against each threat (theft
or diversion and radiological sabotage) at a GROA, and the objectives
and minimum capabilities for the MC&A program. The proposed rule is
risk-informed and performance-based.
B. Whom Would This Action Affect?
Only the DOE, as the potential operator of any repository, would be
impacted by this proposed rule. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 63 are
specific for the Yucca Mountain repository.
C. Why Do the Requirements Need To be Revised?
The current regulations for MC&A and security for a GROA were
developed under a different threat environment, and the threat
environment has changed, as have the plans for surface operations at a
GROA. The NRC now believes that a new regulatory approach for
protecting a GROA is necessary. In addition, the DOE has not set forth
a final concept of operations document for the GROA; therefore, the
types and forms of material to be handled and disposed of at a GROA
have not been finalized. The current security and MC&A requirements for
a GROA are not adequate to protect the common defense and security or
the public health and safety. The new security and MC&A requirements
must be broad enough and sufficiently flexible to cover a range of
possible activities without the need for additional rulemaking. This
rulemaking to upgrade the requirements for physical protection of HLW
and other radioactive materials at a GROA capitalizes on the lessons
learned, current/best practices, and security orders issued to NRC
licensees to address the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment.
The security orders, as well as ongoing security rulemakings, have been
used as the basis for upgrading the GROA security requirements. The
proposed rule would also establish general performance objectives and
corresponding system capabilities for the GROA MC&A program, with a
particular focus on strengthening, streamlining, and consolidating into
10 CFR part 74 all MC&A regulations specific to a GROA.
D. When Do the Security and MC&A Plans Need To Be Submitted?
The DOE should include a description of the security and MC&A plans
in its license application when it is submitted. The actual plans would
be submitted no later than 180 days after the Commission grants the
construction authorization for the GROA. A description of the security
and MC&A plans is necessary at the time of the application to
demonstrate that the DOE can adequately address and meet the NRC
requirements for security and MC&A. Additionally, there may be some
aspects that would be better integrated during construction. Submitting
the plans after the Commission grants a construction authorization
allows the DOE to take advantage of any new technology and concepts
that may not be available at the time the construction application is
submitted. The timing still allows some aspects, if appropriate, to be
addressed during construction. The plans would not need to be
implemented until the Commission grants a license to receive and
possess source, special nuclear, or byproduct material at a GROA.
E. What Types of Material Would Be Covered by the New Security and MC&A
Requirements?
This rule would cover the security and MC&A aspects for the
radioactive material at both surface and subsurface areas where waste
handling activities are conducted. This radioactive material can
include HLW in the form of irradiated reactor fuel and reprocessing
wastes. Section 63.102(b)(4) provides that if the DOE proposes to use
the GROA for storage of radioactive waste other than HLW, the storage
of this radioactive waste is subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part
63. Irradiated reactor fuel contains SNM and fission byproducts.
Depending on the enrichment and quantity, the SNM may be considered
strategic special nuclear material, SNM of moderate strategic
significance, or SNM of low strategic significance. The higher the
enrichment of the SNM, the more attractive the material may be for
malevolent purposes. While it is expected that the primary waste to be
handled at a GROA is irradiated reactor fuel, it is possible that the
DOE may propose the storage of other types of radioactive waste.
Therefore, the Commission has attempted in this proposed rule to
develop security and MC&A requirements that are broad enough to cover
the spectrum of waste materials that could potentially be dispositioned
at a GROA without the need for future rulemaking. The security
requirements that would be established are, in part, based on the
attractiveness of the waste material, shape, size, and the potential
consequences if the waste were used for malevolent purposes. The MC&A
requirements pertain to the SNM content of the waste.
F. What Are the Key Aspects of the Proposed MC&A Requirements?
The proposed rule would establish general performance objectives
and corresponding systems capabilities for the GROA MC&A program, with
a particular focus on strengthening, streamlining, and consolidating in
10 CFR Part 74 all MC&A regulations specific to a GROA. Proposed
objectives for the GROA MC&A program would center on detecting and
responding to a potential loss of SNM, including theft and diversion,
commensurate with the strategic worth of the SNM. The DOE would be
required to submit an MC&A plan describing how those objectives would
be achieved through the implementation of specified system capabilities
commensurate with safeguards risks.
G. What Kinds of Systems Capabilities Would Be Proposed for the MC&A
Program?
The DOE would be required to establish and maintain internal
control, inventory, auditing, and recordkeeping capabilities. Internal
controls would include comprehensive measures for management
structuring, personnel qualification and training, validating receipts
and any shipments, item control, collusion protection, measurements,
and measurement control for resolving anomalies (as needed). This would
include an overall detection and response program and a collusion
program to thwart theft or diversion and would include incorporating
checks and balances that are sufficient to detect falsification of data
and reports that could conceal the theft or diversion of SNM.
Item control of SNM and continuous assurance of its integrity from
receipt to emplacement would be important. If necessary, additional
item control and physical inventory measures may be required for
recovery of waste packages or retrieval of waste packages from
emplacement in Yucca Mountain to an alternate storage or an area for
possible examination or external shipment.
[[Page 72525]]
H. Would Shipper-Receiver Comparisons With Independent Measurements Be
Required for Receipts?
No, the DOE would not be required to conduct independent
measurements on receipts of HLW or SNM at a GROA. The DOE would be
allowed to accept the originator-assigned values. However, the DOE
would be required to routinely assure the validity of each originator's
assigned SNM content values and the integrity of receipts (with
validating physical checking of unique identity, intactness, and
tamper-safing) accepted at a GROA. No routine nondestructive assay
(NDA) measurements of receipts would be required. The DOE would be
required to closely coordinate with originators to adequately
understand the technical basis for assigning SNM content and procedures
to be followed for packaging and assuring item identification and
integrity, (e.g., with reactor fuel burnup calculations, unique serial
numbers, and the tamper-safing of canisters and shipment overpacts).
Tamper-safing refers to the use of devices on containers in a manner
that ensures a clear indication if the device has been removed to allow
opening of the container.
For shipments of commercial SNF to the proposed Yucca Mountain
repository, the DOE is currently expected to be the shipper as the DOE
is expected to take possession of the material at the nuclear reactor.
However, for the purposes of reporting to the Nuclear Material
Management Safeguards System (NMMSS), power reactor utilities would be
expected to complete and file the DOE/NRC Form-741 for transferring the
SNM to the GROA using their respective NRC Reporting Identification
Symbol (RIS). As a result, following the instructions in NUREG/BR-0007
and NMMSS Report D-24, the transfer for MC&A technical purposes would
be made between two NRC RISs--from a power reactor utility RIS to that
assigned to the GROA for receiving and possessing SNM under license.
This is not a new requirement as licensees are currently required to
report transfers of SNM. In their reference to shippers, the MC&A
regulations at Sec. 74.15 are addressing the licensed utilities who
are originating and reporting the transfers with SNM content values
technically assigned by the utility. Any required tamper-safing of
shipments to assure their integrity (e.g., the welding of canisters or
the affixing of tamper-indicating devices on shipping overpacts) would
also be done by such originating shippers from a shipper-receiver
validation/comparison.
I. What Measurements Would Be Necessary Under the GROA MC&A Program?
As warranted, independent confirmatory weight and NDA measurements
of HLW and SNM would be required for off-normal circumstances (e.g., in
resolving certain types of anomalies that may arise and trigger
investigations and special reporting of safeguards events). The state-
of-the-art for NDA and other practical limitations shall be considered
for such nonroutine measurements (e.g., at a wet transfer facility
where bare spent fuel assemblies may be handled). At this point, no
routine onsite measurements are foreseen as necessary to further
validate/accept SNM content values assigned to receipts by the
originators.
J. What Would an MC&A Detection and Response Program Involve?
The focus would be on rapidly detecting and responding to
indications of SNM loss, including possible theft or diversion. This
includes triggering investigations and resolving action on anomalies,
as well as a way to thwart any attempts to covertly steal or divert SNM
by insiders acting individually or in collusion. The design of measures
to counter such a potential internal threat is to include a diversion
path analysis or risk analysis of postulated scenarios considering
conceivable ways and means potential insiders might try to steal or
divert SNM at a GROA.
As background, the general diversion path analysis method that has
been used by the NRC is described in the open literature (R. Hawkins,
S. Baloga, N. Zack, W. Stanbro, and J. Markin, ``Diversion Path
Analysis--A New Approach,'' INMM Proceedings XXI, 763-769, 1992). This
technical paper expanded on diversion path analysis methods originally
developed by the U.S. Bureau of Standards and published by the U.S.
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) (M. Maltese, K.
Goodwin, and J. Scheter, ``Diversion Path Analysis Handbook,'' ERDA,
October 1976). In addition, diversion path analysis methods have been
extensively applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
for designing and implementing its safeguards strategy under the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Regarding the generic
safeguarding of geologic repositories, the IAEA has published a
comprehensive, multi-volume document (``Safeguards for the Final
Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geologic Repositories,'' STR-312, IAEA,
Department of Safeguards, September 1998), which identifies and
analyzes, in considerable detail, resulting diversion paths for a
hypothetical facility.
K. What Additional Requirements Would Be Imposed if the DOE Possesses
Formula Quantities of Strategic SNM That Is in a Form Other Than as
Irradiated Nuclear Reactor Fuel?
Additional requirements would be included for specified system
capabilities for strategic SNM. These requirements include additional
measures for item monitoring and more rigorous access control, quality
assurance, and alarm resolution in concert with any enhanced physical
protection to be provided under 10 CFR Part 73.
L. What Special MC&A-Related Needs Exist?
There is a need to consider risk-informed, performance-based
alternatives for resolving anomalies, particularly onsite NDA
measurements by the DOE in cases where item identity and integrity may
have been compromised. Another need is the extent of item control and
physical inventorying that would be necessary for SNM (in HLW and other
radioactive waste) in underground drifts and at aging pads, especially
from a containment, surveillance, and access control perspective, and a
worker perspective that involves reducing radiation exposure to
personnel to as low as is reasonably achievable, as well as other
impact aspects. The MC&A plan also needs to address SNM control and
accounting functional aspects of retrievability and alternate storage
capabilities that are required by Sec. Sec. 60.21(c)(12) and
63.21(c)(7).
M. What Is the Objective of the Proposed Physical Security
Requirements?
The objective of the proposed physical security requirements is to
provide high assurance that activities at a GROA are not inimical to
the common defense and security, and do not constitute an unreasonable
risk to the public health and safety. In order to provide a high
assurance of protection, the NRC's philosophy is to use a defense-in-
depth strategy towards the protection of HLW. Defense-in-depth relies
on a holistic approach towards the protection of these materials and
other radioactive materials, which includes using people, processes,
equipment, and facilities to protect HLW and other radioactive
materials from theft or diversion or radiological sabotage for
malevolent purposes. The GROA physical security requirements would
[[Page 72526]]
be determined using a graded approach related to the projected risk
from radiological sabotage, theft, or diversion of HLW and other
radioactive materials.
N. What Threat Would a GROA Be Required To Defend Against?
The design basis threat defined in Sec. 73.1(a) would apply to a
GROA in the specific circumstances where a radiological sabotage or
theft and diversion event may involve formula quantities of SNM. Under
the proposed rule, the threat to a GROA is largely defined by specific
security scenarios which represent the greatest threats against which
GROA security forces must be able to defend against, with a high
assurance of success. A GROA would have graded security measures based
on the material, waste form, and operations within a particular
facility at a GROA. Therefore, depending on the material content,
quantity, and consequence from a radiological sabotage event, as well
as the theft or diversion of certain material, the security measures
may rely on the design basis threat defined in Sec. 73.1(a) or may
rely on other Commission requirements. The NRC specifically invites
comment on the physical protection protocol for a GROA. We are
interested in information concerning: Do we need a specific physical
protection protocol for a GROA or should we apply the existing DBT and
increased controls as appropriate.
O. Why Do the Security Requirements Differ for Various Aspects of a
GROA?
The consequences of radiological and theft or diversion security
events are highly dependent on the characteristics and packaging of the
HLW and other radioactive materials and their location within a GROA.
The activities and operations at a GROA aid in defining the physical
security requirements and protective strategies that would be
implemented. At this time, the GROA concept of operations has not been
fully defined by the DOE; therefore, the NRC is establishing physical
security requirements that would be dependent upon the consequences of
a potential radiological event and the theft or diversion of certain
material. These physical security requirements would be based on five
proposed protection levels. The highest protection level would be for
waste containing strategic SNM with the protection system designed to
protect the material against the design basis threat for both theft or
diversion and radiological sabotage. The next protection level would be
for radioactive material that could result in a significant
radiological sabotage event releasing radioactive materials in
sufficient quantity such that any individual located at the lesser of
the controlled area boundary or 400 meters from the source could
receive a total effective dose equivalent equal to or greater than 0.25
Sv (25 rem). For these materials, the protection system must be
designed to protect against the design basis threat for radiological
sabotage. The third protection level would be for radioactive material
that could result in a moderate radiological sabotage event releasing
radioactive materials in sufficient quantity such that any individual
located at the lesser of the controlled area boundary or 400 meters
from the source could receive a total effective dose equivalent equal
to or greater than 0.05 Sv (5 rem) but less than 0.25 Sv (25 rem). For
these materials, the protection system must be designed to protect the
material against radiological sabotage. The fourth protection level
would be for all other radioactive material containing SNM. The
physical protection system would be designed to protect the material
against security-related events specified for theft and diversion. The
lowest protection level would be for other solidified radioactive
material and material that would meet the criteria in appendix P to 10
CFR part 110 (Categories 1 and 2 radioactive materials). The protective
strategy for these materials would be equivalent to the increased
controls (i.e., prevent or impede removal, locate and prompt recovery,
and mitigation of any potential consequence).
P. Would Access Authorization Requirements Apply to a GROA and What
Would They Cover?
Yes, access authorization requirements would apply to a GROA. The
facilities that possess large radiation sources, such as irradiated
nuclear reactor fuels (e.g., SNF), are attractive targets for those who
seek to commit radiological malevolent acts. Insiders who have
unescorted access to facilities that possess such radiation sources,
including a GROA, could pose a threat to the public health and safety
or the common defense and security because they may have the ability to
commit radiological malevolent acts. Therefore, imposing access
authorization requirements is a prudent security measure to ensure that
individuals who are granted unescorted access to the protected area of
a GROA: (1) Are trustworthy and reliable; (2) do not impose an
unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public or the common
defense and security (as a result of increasing the likelihood of an
insider threat); and (3) do not pose a potential threat to commit
radiological malevolent acts or theft or diversion of HLW. Fingerprints
are required of any individual granted unescorted access to the
protected area of a GROA.
Q. Would Criminal History Checks Apply to a GROA?
Section 652 of the EPAct amended Section 149 of the AEA to require
fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of Investigation identification and
criminal history records check of any person who is permitted
unescorted access to radioactive materials subject to regulation by the
Commission, and which the Commission determines to be of such
significance to the public health and safety or the common defense and
security as to warrant fingerprinting and background checks. The
Commission has determined that the radioactive material at a GROA is of
such significance and is proposing to implement the requirement for
fingerprinting and a FBI identification and criminal history records
check of any person who is permitted unescorted access to radioactive
materials at a GROA. Background investigations, which include criminal
history checks, represent a key element of the access authorization
program ensuring that individuals who have unescorted access to a GROA
are trustworthy and reliable. To accomplish this task, requirements
were developed that focused on accumulating data on an individual's
past that would produce an overall perspective of the individual's
character and allow the licensee to make a determination of
trustworthiness and reliability.
R. What Are the Key Aspects of the Security Requirements?
The key aspects of the security requirements for a GROA are similar
to the security requirements for similar types of NRC-licensed material
and facilities. The proposed regulations would require an integrated
security plan that would implement defense-in-depth concepts and
protective strategies based on protecting target sets from various
threat scenarios. The requirements are performance based and include an
access authorization program and a physical protection system to
detect, delay, and respond to postulated threat scenarios in such a way
that prevents or mitigates undesirable consequences of malevolent
actions. The postulated threat scenarios include the theft or diversion
of SNM and HLW as well as radiological sabotage. The access
authorization program requirements include measures
[[Page 72527]]
necessary to assure that personnel having critical safety or security
functions or having access to certain nuclear materials remain
trustworthy and reliable. The physical protection system requirements
for detection measures include intrusion sensing, alarm communication,
alarm assessment, and entry or access controls. Detection would be
provided through the use of detection equipment, patrols, access
controls, and other program elements required by this proposed rule. It
also would provide notification to the licensee that a potential threat
is present and where the threat is located. Alarm assessment is the
mechanism through which the licensee obtains the information necessary
to identify the nature of the threat detected and to determine how to
respond. There are access control requirements for personnel, vehicles,
and hazardous materials. The requirements for delay measures include
barriers to delay adversarial actions to allow a timely response by
security personnel. The requirements for responding to malevolent
events allow the DOE to develop effective response strategies to
challenge intruders so they cannot accomplish actions that are
necessary to achieving undesirable consequences. In some instances, the
strategy may include neutralizing adversaries to deny access to the
nuclear material. The proposed rule uses a risk-informed approach for
response requirements that permits protective strategies to be tailored
to the type of material being protected, operations that involve
handling this material and the potential consequences of postulated
threat scenarios.
Security personnel who are responsible for the protection of the
radioactive waste would be required to meet minimum requirements and
performance criteria. The DOE would have to meet general criteria
requirements for selection, training, equipping, testing,
qualification, and contingency plans of security forces involved in
GROA operations. These requirements would include hiring personnel who
function as drill and exercise controllers to ensure that security
forces are trained and qualified to execute their assigned duties.
Drills and exercises are key elements to assuring the preparedness of
the security force and must be conducted in a manner that demonstrates
the DOE's ability to execute the protective strategy as described in
the site security plans. As for contingency plans, the information
required in the safeguards contingency plans includes responses to
threats, up to and including design basis threats, as described in
Sec. 73.1(a). The DOE would be required to submit for NRC approval a
plan detailing how the prescribed criteria are going to be met.
S. What Is a Target Set as it Applies to a GROA?
As it applies to a GROA, target set means the combination of
equipment or operator actions which, if all are prevented from
performing their intended safety function or prevented from being
accomplished, would likely result in significant operational disruption
or radiological contamination barring extraordinary action by site
operators. For a GROA, a target set means the quantities and form of
HLW and other radioactive material and the protective and mitigative
measures to protect against potential large scale releases of fission
products from malevolent actions. For example, a target set with
respect to spent fuel sabotage at a GROA could be draining the spent
fuel pool leaving the spent fuel uncovered for a period of time,
allowing spent fuel to heat up, and the associated potential for
release of fission products. Due to the sensitivity of this
information, specific target sets to the GROA will not be available in
a public document.
T. What Weapons Authorization Would Be Necessary for the GROA
Operations?
There are two ways weapons may be authorized for use at a GROA.
First, section 161A of the AEA allows the NRC to authorize licensees to
use, as part of their protective strategies, an expanded arsenal of
weapons, including machine guns. Section 161A was added to the AEA
under the EPAct. Secondly, under section 161k. of the AEA, the DOE has
separate authority for authorization of weapons on any of its sites.
The DOE, under its own authority under section 161k. of the AEA, may
authorize the use of an expanded weapons arsenal, limited arrest
authority, and the use of force in accordance with the DOE's current
regulations under 10 CFR part 1047. The NRC does not plan to use its
authority under Section 161A of the AEA.
U. Would DOE Be Required To Conduct Force-on-Force Exercises for the
GROA Facility?
Yes, some type of force-on-force exercises are necessary to test
the effectiveness of the DOE's protective strategies for the high-
consequence target sets. The requirement for annual force-on-force
exercises only applies to formula quantities of strategic SNM and
significant radiological sabotage consequence target sets.
V. How Would the Security Plans Handle Construction at a GROA After
Receipt of HLW Begins?
A license to receive and possess source, special nuclear, or
byproduct material at a GROA may only be issued by the Commission on a
finding that construction of the GROA has been substantially completed.
Construction may be considered substantially complete if the
construction of surface and interconnecting structures, systems, and
components and any underground storage space required for initial
operation are substantially complete. Some construction activities
could continue once receipt of material begins.
The NRC's security requirements are designed to protect all
material at a GROA. Handling, storage, and emplacement operations for
HLW and other radioactive materials shall be conducted inside a
protected area. The NRC's security requirements are flexible enough to
allow the DOE to establish a protected area that could separate
remaining construction activities from operations involving HLW and
other radioactive material. Any construction activity occurring within
the protected area would be subject to the NRC's security requirements.
Any construction activities outside the protected area, but within the
DOE controlled area, would be subject to some NRC security controls and
DOE security orders. The protected area and security plans would be
expanded to include new facilities or areas before radioactive material
could be received in that new facility or area.
W. Does This Rulemaking Cover Transportation of High-Level Radioactive
Waste to a GROA?
No, the NRC's regulatory authority is limited to the operations at
a GROA. As an independent Federal Agency, the DOE must comply with its
own internal requirements (DOE orders) and Departments of
Transportation and Homeland Security regulations when transporting HLW
and other radioactive materials to a GROA. However, the DOE must use
shipping containers certified by the NRC under the regulations in 10
CFR part 71. Part 71 is not being revised by this proposed rule.
X. Would the Security and MC&A Plans Cover Postclosure?
No, these plans would not cover the postclosure period. Once the
NRC license is terminated, the NRC would no longer have regulatory
authority. However, the DOE plans for continued
[[Page 72528]]
oversight of the Yucca Mountain site after permanent closure.
Y. What Safeguards Reporting Requirements Would Be Proposed for a GROA?
Prompt notification to the NRC of a security event involving an
actual or imminent threat would permit the NRC to contact other Federal
authorities and other licensees, as appropriate. The Commission would
expect the DOE to notify the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible
after they notify local law enforcement agencies, but within 15
minutes. A written 60-day report would also be required for these
notifications. This new reporting requirement would require the DOE to
promptly notify the NRC of any event involving an actual or imminent
threat at the GROA.
Four-hour notification would be proposed for suspicious activities,
attempts at access, etc., that may indicate pre-operational
surveillance, reconnaissance, or intelligence gathering activities
targeted against the GROA. This would assist the intelligence and
homeland security communities in evaluating threats across critical
infrastructure sectors.
The current provision for one-hour notifications for certain
safeguards events (e.g., theft or unlawful diversion of SNM,
significant physical damage to the facility, entry of an unauthorized
person into protected areas) would be retained, with some modifications
to include attempted actions and to broaden the scope of the language
used for specific areas. The provision for events to be recorded in the
safeguards log would also be retained.
Z. Does the NRC Plan To Issue Guidance Documents?
Yes, the NRC intends to issue guidance documents. The NRC intends
to issue a GROA-specific regulatory guidance document. This document
would address adversary characteristics for the design basis threats
and describe details of the GROA security-related threats. Other
guidance documents are under consideration. The publication of the
guidance documents is planned after the publication of the final rule.
Because the guidance documents may contain Safeguards Information and/
or classified information, these documents would only be available to
those with a need-to-know, and who are qualified to have access to
Safeguards Information and/or classified information, as applicable.
However, the NRC has determined that access to these guidance documents
is not necessary for the public or other stakeholders to provide
informed comment on this proposed rule.
AA. Would the GROA Facilities Be Subject to IAEA Safeguards?
The U.S. Government has not yet made a determination as to whether
a GROA can be subject to IAEA safeguards.
BB. What Changes Would Be Made to the Emergency Plan Requirements?
The emergency plan requirements would be changed to reflect the
need to respond to radiological emergencies instead of radiological
accidents. The term radiological emergencies is more inclusive of the
types of situations that the emergency plan may need to address. In
addition, Sec. 63.21(c)(21) requires a description of the plan for
responding to, and recovering from, radiological emergencies; the
proposed change is consistent with this language.
CC. What Should I Consider as I Prepare My Comments to NRC?
Tips for preparing your comments--when submitting your comments,
remember to:
i. Identify the rulemaking (RIN 3150-AI06).
ii. Explain why you agree or disagree; suggest alternatives and
substitute language for your requested changes.
iii. Describe any assumptions and provide any technical information
and/or data that you used.
iv. If you estimate potential costs or burdens, explain how you
arrived at your estimate in sufficient detail to allow for it to be
reproduced.
v. Provide specific examples to illustrate your concerns, and
suggest alternatives.
vi. Explain your views as clearly as possible.
vii. Make sure to submit your comments by the comment period
deadline identified.
viii. See item N of the Discussion portion of this notice for NRC's
specific request for comments on the need for a specific physical
protection protocol for a GROA. See Section VI of the preamble for the
request for comments on the use of plain language and Section XI for
the request for comments on the draft regulatory analysis.
III. Discussion of Proposed Amendments by Section
Section 60.21 Content of Application
Paragraph (b)(3) would be revised to change the reference for the
security requirements from Sec. 73.51 to the new requirements in Sec.
73.53 and to require a description instead of plans. Paragraph (b)(4)
would be revised to change the reference for the MC&A requirements from
Sec. 60.78 to the new requirements in 10 CFR Part 74. The actual plans
would be submitted after the construction authorization was issued. The
security and MC&A plans would not be implemented until SNM is received
at the GROA.
Section 60.24 Updating of Application and Environmental Impact
Statement
Paragraph (d) would be added to require the DOE to submit the
actual security plans and MC&A plan for NRC approval no later than 180
days after the Commission issues the construction authorization. Under
the current regulations, the DOE was not required to submit the actual
MC&A plan for NRC approval. This requirement corrects that oversight.
Section 60.78 Criticality Reporting
This section would be renamed to reflect the criticality reporting
that remains after the MC&A requirements are relocated to 10 CFR part
74. Currently, the criticality reporting requirement is captured by the
reference to Sec. 72.74. The section would be revised to include the
criticality reporting requirement instead of a reference to another
section. The actual requirements would not change.
Section 63.21 Content of Application
Paragraph (b)(3) would be revised to change the reference for the
security requirements from Sec. 73.51 to the new requirements in Sec.
73.53 and would clarify that only a description of the program need be
submitted with the construction application. Paragraph (b)(4) would be
revised to change the reference for the MC&A requirements from Sec.
63.78 to the new requirements in 10 CFR part 74. The actual security
and MC&A plans would be submitted after the construction authorization
was issued. The security and MC&A plans would not be implemented until
SNM is received at the GROA.
Section 63.24 Updating of Application and Environmental Impact
Statement
Paragraph (d) would be added to require the DOE to submit the
actual security plans and MC&A plan for NRC approval no later than 180
days after the Commission issues the construction authorization. Under
the current regulations, the DOE was not required to submit the actual
plans for NRC approval. This requirement corrects that oversight.
Section 63.78 Criticality Reporting
This section would be renamed to reflect the criticality reporting
that remains after the MC&A requirements are relocated to 10 CFR part
74.
[[Page 72529]]
Currently, the criticality reporting requirement is captured by the
reference to Sec. 72.74. The section would be revised to include the
criticality reporting requirement instead of a reference to another
section. The actual requirements would not change.
Section 63.161 Emergency Plan for the Geologic Repository Operations
Area Through Permanent Closure
This section would be revised to refer to radiological emergencies
instead of radiological accidents. The term radiological emergencies is
more inclusive of the types of situations that the emergency plan may
need to address. In addition, Sec. 63.21(c)(21) requires a description
of the plan for responding to, and recovering from, radiological
emergencies; the proposed change is consistent with that language. The
reference to develop and implement a plan to ``cope with radiological
accidents'' is changed to a plan to ``provide reasonable assurance that
adequate protective measures can and would be taken in the event of a
radiological emergency.''
Section 73.2 Definitions
This section would be revised to incorporate the definition for
high-level radioactive waste in 10 CFR part 63 and to add a definition
for target set for application to a GROA.
Section 73.50 Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed
Activities
This section would be revised to include a reference to Sec. 73.53
to retain the exemption for a GROA from the security requirements
listed in the section. Requirements for a GROA are specified in
proposed Sec. 73.53.
Section 73.51 Requirements for Physical Protection of Stored Spent
Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste
This section would be revised to remove references to a GROA. The
security requirements for an ISFSI and a monitored retrievable storage
installation would remain unchanged. The requirements for a GROA would
be contained in new section 73.53.
Section 73.53 Requirements for Physical Protection at a Geologic
Repository Operations Area
The proposed rule would create a new section for the GROA physical
protection requirements. The existing requirements for GROA security
are contained in Sec. 73.51(b), (c), and (d). The requirements have
been expanded and strengthened to reflect the post-September 11, 2001,
threat environment and placed in this new section.
Paragraph (a) would establish that the physical protection
requirements in this section apply to The DOE for the operation of a
GROA.
Paragraph (b)(1) would require The DOE to submit a Physical
Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards
Contingency Plan that describe how the requirements of the section
would be met. The plans would be submitted no later than 180 days after
the NRC issues a construction authorization for a GROA. Paragraph
(b)(1) would also establish the implementation timeframe. Paragraph
(b)(2) would exempt the DOE from the security requirements after
permanent closure of a GROA. This provision is currently located at
Sec. 73.51(e).
Paragraph (c) would establish the performance objectives. Paragraph
(c)(1) would establish the general performance objective to provide
high assurance that activities involving radioactive waste are not
inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an
unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. The current general
objective does not address common defense and security. Paragraphs
(c)(2) and (c)(3) would establish objectives based on the type and form
of material and the consequences of a postulated radiological sabotage
event. The more risk-significant the material, the higher the level of
protection required.
Paragraph (d) would establish general requirements for the physical
security program. The DOE would be required to design and implement a
program to satisfy the performance requirements and to ensure that no
single act can disable the personnel, equipment, or systems necessary
to prevent the theft of strategic SNM and significant radiological
sabotage. The DOE would also be required to establish and maintain a
written performance evaluation program, an access authorization
program, an insider mitigation program, and a corrective action
program.
Paragraph (e) would require the DOE to develop security plans that
describe how the physical protection program would prevent the theft or
diversion and radiological sabotage of SNM and byproduct material and
to protect safeguards information against unauthorized disclosure. The
DOE would be required to establish, implement, and maintain written
procedures and to have a process for the DOE's approval of implementing
procedures. The DOE would be allowed to make changes to the security
plans without NRC approval as long as the changes do not decrease the
plan's effectiveness. The DOE would be required to establish, maintain,
and follow a Commission-approved training and qualification plan and a
safeguards contingency plan and to establish, implement, and maintain a
Commission-approved physical security plan.
Paragraph (f) would require the DOE to establish and maintain a
security organization designed, staffed, trained, and equipped to
provide early detection, assessment, and response to unauthorized
activities within any area of the facility. The Commission expectation
would be that the management system oversee all aspects of the onsite
physical protection program to ensure the effective implementation of
Commission requirements through the approved security plans and
implementing procedures. The DOE would also be required to ensure that
any written agreement with any contractor used to implement the onsite
physical protection program was retained as a record for the duration
of the contract and that the contract clearly state several conditions
related to training, access authorization, and document availability.
Provisions regarding the security organization are currently addressed
at Sec. 73.51(d)(5). The proposed requirements would strengthen and
expand on the current requirements.
Paragraph (g) would provide a performance-based requirement for
determining the use and placement of physical barriers for the
protection of personnel, equipment, and systems, the failure of which
could directly or indirectly endanger public health and safety. The DOE
would be required to establish and maintain physical barriers in the
controlled area, as necessary, to deter, delay, or prevent unauthorized
access; facilitate the early detection of unauthorized activities; and
control approach routes to the facility. Paragraph (g) would establish
requirements related to physical barriers (paragraph (g)(3)), isolation
zones (paragraph (g)(4)), protected areas (paragraph (g)(5)), vital
areas (paragraph (g)(6)), vehicle barrier systems (paragraph (g)(7)),
and unattended openings (paragraph (g)(8)). Current provisions
addressing physical barriers are located at Sec. 73.51(d)(1). The
proposed requirements would strengthen and expand on the current
requirements.
Paragraph (h) would require the DOE to develop and identify target
sets and document the analyses and methodologies used to determine and
group the target set equipment or
[[Page 72530]]
elements. The DOE would also be required to implement a program for the
oversight of certain facility equipment and systems documented as part
of the DOE protective strategy.
Paragraph (i) would require the DOE to establish an access control
program for personnel, vehicles, and material. The paragraph would
establish the features required for the access control program,
including access control points, emergency conditions, vehicles, access
control devices, visitors, and escorts. Current provisions addressing
access control are found at Sec. 73.51(b)(2), 73.51(d)(7), and
73.51(d)(9). The proposed requirements would strengthen and expand on
the current requirements.
Paragraph (j) would establish the requirements for search programs
for individuals, packages, and vehicles. This paragraph would expand
and strengthen the current requirements located in Sec. 73.51(d)(9).
Paragraph (k) would establish the requirements for the detection
and assessment systems. The DOE would be required to establish and
maintain an intrusion detection and assessment system that must provide
the capability for early detection and assessment of unauthorized
persons and activities. This proposed requirement would not mandate
specific intrusion detection equipment for any specific area, but
rather would require that the system provide detection and assessment
capabilities that meet Commission requirements. The current
requirements addressing detection and assessment systems are located at
Sec. 73.51(b)(2), 73.51(d)(2), 73.51(d)(3), 73.51(d)(4), and
73.51(d)(11). The proposed requirements would strengthen and expand on
the current requirements.
Paragraph (l) would require the DOE to establish and maintain
continuous communication capability with onsite and offsite resources
to ensure effective command and control during both normal and
emergency situations. The chosen communication method would be
available and operating any time it would be needed to communicate
information. The proposed requirements would strengthen and expand on
the current requirements located at Sec. 73.51(b)(2), 73.51(d)(6), and
73.51(d)(8).
Paragraph (m) would establish the response requirements for
personnel and equipment and armed responders. The DOE would be required
to establish and maintain the minimum number of properly trained and
equipped personnel required to intercept, challenge, delay and/or
neutralize any security related events.
Paragraph (n) would require the DOE to implement a cyber-security
program that provides high assurance that computer systems, which if
compromised could adversely impact safety, security, and emergency
preparedness, are protected from cyber attacks.
Paragraph (o) would establish the requirements for security program
reviews and audits. The DOE would be required to review the physical
protection program at intervals not to exceed 12 months or as necessary
based upon assessments or other performance indicators with each
element being reviewed at least every 24 months. The DOE would also be
required to conduct quarterly drills and annual exercises in accordance
with Section III of Appendix C of 10 CFR part 73 and the DOE
performance evaluation program. The proposed requirements expand on the
current requirement for a physical protection program review every 24
months that is in Sec. 73.51(d)(12).
Paragraph (p) would require the DOE to implement a maintenance,
testing and calibration program to ensure that security programs and
equipment are tested for operability and performance at predetermined
intervals, are maintained in operable condition, and are capable of
performing their intended function when needed.
Paragraph (q) would require the DOE to identify measures and
criteria needed to compensate for the loss or reduced performance of
personnel, equipment systems, and components that are required to meet
the requirements.
Paragraph (r) would authorize the DOE to suspend implementation of
affected requirements of Sec. 73.53 in an emergency when action is
immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and during
severe weather when the suspension is needed to protect personnel from
a life threatening situation. In both cases, a designated senior site
manager would need to approve the suspension before taking the action.
Paragraph (s) would require the DOE to maintain all records
required to be kept until the Commission terminates the license and to
maintain superseded portions of these records for at least 3 years
after the record is superseded.
Paragraph (t) would require the DOE to develop and implement a
process to inform and coordinate safety and security activities to
ensure that these requirements do not adversely affect the capabilities
of the security organization to satisfy the security requirements or
overall GROA safety.
Paragraph (u) would provide a mechanism for the DOE to receive
approval for use of alternative measures to those required by Sec.
73.53. Current provisions for alternative measures are covered by Sec.
73.51(d).
Paragraph (v) would contain additional performance capabilities
that must be met if the DOE were to possess formula quantities of
strategic SNM, unless otherwise approved by the Commission. These
additional measures include requirements on the security organization;
physical barrier subsystem; access control subsystem and procedures;
search programs; detection, surveillance, and alarm subsystems and
procedures; and response requirements.
Section 73.56a Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for a
Geologic Repository Operations Area
This section would be added to address the requirements for the
personnel access authorization program for a GROA. The current
regulations require the DOE to grant access to the protected area only
to individuals who are authorized to enter the protected area; however,
there are no specific requirements for the access authorization
program. The proposed program addresses the integration of the access
authorization requirements and security program requirements. The
proposed performance objective is to provide high assurance that
individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable,
such that they do not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health
and safety or the common defense and security, including the potential
to commit radiological sabotage, theft, or diversion. The proposed rule
would establish requirements for the background investigation
(paragraph (d)), psychological assessments (paragraph (e)), behavioral
observation (paragraph (f)), arrest reporting (paragraph (g)), granting
unescorted access authorization (paragraph (h)), maintaining access
authorization (paragraph (i)), access to vital areas (paragraph (j)),
trustworthiness and reliability of background screeners and
authorization program personnel (paragraph (k)), review procedures
(paragraph (l)), protection of information (paragraph (m)), audits and
corrective action (paragraph (n)), and records (paragraph (o)). The
proposed requirements are nearly identical as those proposed for power
reactors (71 FR 62664; October 26, 2006).
[[Page 72531]]
Section 73.57 Requirements for Criminal History Checks of Individuals
Granted Unescorted Access to a Nuclear Power Facility or the Protected
Area of a Geologic Repository Operations Area, or Access to Safeguards
Information by Power Reactor Licensees
This section would be retitled to include the protected area of a
GROA. New paragraph (a)(4) would be added to require the DOE to comply
with the requirements for criminal history checks contained in this
section upon receipt of Commission authorization to receive and possess
source, special nuclear, or byproduct material at a GROA. Paragraph
(b)(2)(iii) would be added to expand the requirements for criminal
history checks to anyone granted unescorted access to the protected
area of a GROA. Paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(4)(i), (b)(5), (b)(8),
(c)(1), (d)(1), (f)(2), and (f)(5) would be revised to expand the
requirements to individuals granted unescorted access to the protected
area of a GROA.
Section 73.70 Records
The introductory paragraph would be revised to include a reference
to Sec. 73.53. Paragraph (c)(1) would be added to include a reference
to Sec. 73.53(i)(7). A new paragraph (c)(1) is being proposed because
changes to paragraph (c) have been proposed in the power security rule
and it could cause confusion to stakeholders to propose additional
changes to the same section. This section would establish the
requirements for record retention. Record retention requirements are
currently located in Sec. 73.51(c), 73.51(d)(10), and 73.51(d)(13).
The record retention period remains 3 years or termination of the
license, depending on the record type.
Section 73.71a Reporting of Safeguards Events for a GROA
Section 73.71a would be created to contain the safeguards reporting
events that are specific to a GROA. A new section is being proposed
because significant changes to this section have been proposed in the
power reactor security rule and it could cause significant confusion to
stakeholders to propose additional changes to the same section. A new
reporting requirement is proposed that would require the DOE to
promptly notify the NRC of any event involving an actual or imminent
threat. Four-hour notification is being proposed for suspicious events
and tampering events not otherwise covered under Appendix G. The
provision for one-hour notifications for certain safeguards events
(e.g., theft or unlawful diversion of SNM, significant physical damage
to any facility, entry of an unauthorized person into protected areas.)
would be retained, with some modifications to include attempted actions
and to broaden the scope of the language used for specified areas. The
provisions for events to be recorded in the safeguards log would be
retained with minor revisions. Requirements for making the required
telephonic and written notifications are also proposed.
Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 73--General Criteria for Security Personnel
A new Section VII, ``Geologic Repository Operations Area Training
and Qualification Plan,'' would contain the training and qualification
requirements for security personnel. These new requirements would
include additional physical requirements for unarmed security personnel
to assure the personnel performing these functions meet physical
requirements commensurate with their duties. Proposed new requirements
also include a minimum age requirement of 18 years for unarmed
responders, qualification scores for testing required by the training
and qualification plan, qualification requirements for security
trainers, qualification requirements of personnel assessing
psychological qualifications, armorer certification requirements, and
program requirements for on-the-job training.
Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73--Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans
A new Section III, ``Geologic repository operations area safeguards
contingency plans,'' would establish the requirements that govern the
development of the safeguards contingency plan for a GROA. Proposed
requirements include specific references to personnel who function as
drill and exercise controllers to ensure these persons are trained and
qualified to execute their assigned duties. Drills and exercises are
key elements to assuring the preparedness of the GROA security force
and must be conducted in a manner that demonstrates the DOE's ability
to execute the protective strategy as described in the site security
plans. Additionally drills and exercises must be performed properly to
assure they do not negatively impact personnel or facility safety.
Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 73--Reportable Safeguards Events
The introductory paragraph would be revised to include a reference
to Sec. Sec. 73.71a and 73.53 to address the reporting provisions that
would apply specifically to a GROA. The reporting requirements would be
revised to support the revised reporting requirements from proposed
Sec. 73.71a. Paragraph V would be added to require prompt reporting
(not later than 15 minutes of discovery) after the discovery of an
imminent or actual threat against the facility. Paragraph VI would
contain the reports to be reported within one (1) hour. Paragraph VII
would contain the events to be reported with four (4) hours. Paragraph
VIII would contain the events to be recorded in the safeguards log.
Section 74.1 Purpose
Paragraph (b) would be revised to include a reference to Sec. Sec.
60.21 and 63.21 to cover submittal of a license application for a GROA.
Section 74.2 Scope
Paragraph (b) would be revised to include a reference to the
proposed Subpart F.
Section 74.4 Definitions
This section would be revised to add definitions for accounting,
custodian, high-level radioactive waste, item control area, item
control program, and material balance area.
Section 74.13 Material Status Reports
Paragraph (a) would be revised to require the submittal of Material
Status Reports within 60 calendar days of the GROA physical inventory.
This requirement was previously covered by Sec. 72.76.
Section 74.17 Special Nuclear Material Physical Inventory Summary
Report
Paragraph (d) would be added to require the DOE to submit Special
Nuclear Material Physical Inventory Summary Reports for the GROA.
Section 74.19 Recordkeeping
Paragraphs (a) and (c) would be revised to exempt a GROA from the
recordkeeping requirements because the recordkeeping requirements for a
GROA would be specified in a new Subpart F.
Subpart F--Geologic Repository Operations Area
This new subpart would contain the MC&A requirements that are
specific for a GROA. The new Subpart would contain requirements that
are both risk informed and performance based.
Section 74.71 Nuclear Material Control and Accounting for a Geologic
Repository Operations Area (GROA)
This new section would contain the MC&A general performance
objectives (paragraph (a)), the systems capabilities
[[Page 72532]]
(paragraph (b)), and the implementation dates (paragraph (c)) for a
GROA. Required systems capabilities and features would be commensurate
with the kind, amount, and specifications of the SNM proposed to be
possessed at a GROA.
Paragraph (a) would require the DOE to establish, implement, and
maintain a Commission-approved MC&A program that meets the following
performance objectives: (1) Maintain accurate, current, and reliable
information on, and confirm the quantities and locations of, SNM; (2)
detect, respond to, and resolve any anomalies indicating a possible
loss of SNM; (3) permit rapid determination of whether an actual loss
of a significant amount of SNM has occurred: (4) generate and provide,
as requested, information to aid in the investigation and recovery of
missing SNM; and (5) control access to MC&A information that might
assist adversaries in possible attempts to carry out a theft or
diversion, or to help target HLW for radiological sabotage.
Paragraph (b) would require the DOE to include the capabilities and
features specified in Section 74.73 in the MC&A program.
Paragraph (c) would require the DOE to submit an MC&A plan that
describes how the performance objectives would be achieved and the
system capabilities would be met. The plan would be submitted no later
than 180 days after the NRC issues a construction authorization for the
GROA. Paragraph (c) would also require the DOE to implement the
Commission-approved MC&A plan upon issuance of a license to receive and
possess source, special nuclear, or byproduct material at the GROA or
by a date specified in a license condition.
Section 74.73 Internal Controls, Inventory, and Records
This new section would establish the internal controls (paragraphs
(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h)), inventory requirements
(paragraph (i)), additional provisions for receipt of strategic SNM
(paragraph (j)), and the recordkeeping requirements (paragraph (k)) for
the MC&A program.
Paragraph (a) would require the DOE to establish and maintain the
internal control, inventory, and recordkeeping capabilities that would
be required by paragraphs (b) through (k).
Paragraph (b) would require the DOE to establish, document, and
maintain a management structure that assures clear overall
responsibility for the MC&A program, would be independent of other
operations, and would provide for separation of key responsibilities.
The DOE would also be required to provide for the adequate review,
approval, and use of written procedures.
Paragraph (c) would require the DOE to assure that personnel that
work in key positions are trained to maintain a high-level of
safeguards awareness and are qualified to perform their duties.
Paragraph (d) would require the DOE to perform and document
independent reviews and assessments of the total MC&A program at
intervals not to exceed 24 months.
Paragraph (e) would require the DOE to establish, document,
implement, and maintain an item control program that: (1) Provides
current knowledge of all HLW items with respect to unique identity,
element and isotope content, and location from receipt to underground
emplacement and possible retrieval and alternate storage; (2) assures
that the integrity of items is maintained such that the unauthorized
removal of SNM would be readily apparent; (3) maintains and follows
procedures for any tamper-safing program that is to be used for
assuring the validity of prior measurements; and (4) stipulates the use
of the 2-person rule for sealing operations, affixing tamper-indicating
devices, handling of bare fuel assemblies, performing physical
inventories, and internal transfers.
Paragraph (f) would require the DOE to establish, implement, and
maintain an anomaly, detection, and response program that incorporates
checks and balances sufficient to thwart attempts to divert SNM and to
detect falsification of data and reports that could conceal the theft
or diversion of SNM. The program would also be required to detect and
respond to a potential loss or misuse of SNM, including the theft or
diversion of SNM by an internal threat using collusion, stealth, and
deceit. The overall design of the detection and response program would
need to include an analysis of conceivable ways and means through which
clandestine attempts of theft, diversion, or other misuse might occur.
Paragraph (g) would require the DOE to establish, document,
implement, and maintain a program to reasonably assure the validity of
assigned SNM quantities, including a measurement system and a
measurement control program that maintains a level of effectiveness
sufficient to satisfy the capabilities required for resolving
anomalies, as needed.
Paragraph (h) would require the DOE to provide information to the
NRC or other agencies deemed necessary for conducting an investigation
of actual (or highly suspected) events pertaining to missing SNM and
information relevant to recovery of the SNM.
Paragraph (i) would require the DOE to perform a facility-wide
physical inventory of all possessed SNM to close material balances at
intervals not to exceed 12 calendar months. The paragraph would further
require the DOE to provide written instructions for conducting the
physical inventories. Within 60 days after the start of the inventory,
the DOE would be required to reconcile and adjust the book record, as
appropriate, to the results of the physical inventory and to
investigate and resolve, or report any unresolved inventory difference
or discrepancy to the NRC.
Paragraph (j) would require the DOE to establish additional
measures, if the DOE were to receive formula quantities of strategic
SNM that are in a form other than irradiated reactor fuel or high-level
radioactive waste. These additional measures include: (1) Item-
monitoring features as specified in Sec. 74.55; (2) alarm resolution
as specified in Sec. 74.57; (3) quality assurance and accounting
capabilities as specified in Sec. 74.59; (4) establishment of
controlled areas for strategic SNM; and (5) semi-annual physical
inventories of all strategic SNM.
Paragraph (k) would require the DOE to establish records that
demonstrate that the requirements have been met, to maintain the
records in duplicate in an auditable form, and to retain the records
until the Commission terminates the GROA license. The paragraph also
requires the DOE to retain procedures until the Commission terminates
the license, with superceded portions of a procedure to be retained for
3 years after the portion is superceded. The DOE would also be required
to maintain adequate safeguards against tampering with and loss of
records. The DOE must also satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 60.71 or
63.71 for records on the receipt, handling, and disposition of
radioactive waste at a GROA.
IV. Criminal Penalties
For the purpose of Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), as
amended, the Commission is proposing to amend 10 CFR parts 60, 63, 73,
and 74 under one or more of Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA.
Criminal penalties, as they apply to regulations in part 73, are
discussed in Sec. 73.81. The new Sec. Sec. 73.53, 73.56a, and 73.71a
are issued under Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA, and are not
included in Sec. 73.81(b). Criminal penalties, as they apply to
regulations in part 74, are discussed in Sec. 74.84. The new
Sec. Sec. 74.71 and 74.73 are issued under Sections 161b, 161i, or
[[Page 72533]]
161o of the AEA, and are not included in Sec. 74.84(b). Willful
violations of the rule would be subject to criminal enforcement.
V. Agreement State Compatibility
Under the ``Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of
Agreement State Programs'' approved by the Commission on June 30, 1997,
and published in the Federal Register on September 3, 1997 (62 FR
46517), this rule is classified as Compatibility Category ``NRC.''
Compatibility is not required for Category ``NRC'' regulations. The NRC
program elements in this category are those that relate directly to
areas of regulation reserved to the NRC by the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, or the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations.
VI. Plain Language
The Presidential Memorandum, ``Plain Language in Government
Writing,'' published June 10, 1998 (63 FR 31883), directed that the
Government's documents be in clear and accessible language. The NRC
requests comments on this proposed rule specifically with respect to
the clarity and effectiveness of the language used. Comments should be
sent to the address listed under the ADDRESSES heading.
VII. Voluntary Consensus Standards
The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (Pub.
L. 104-113) requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that
are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies unless
the use of such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or
otherwise impractical. In this proposed rule, the NRC would establish
security and MC&A requirements for a GROA. This action does not
constitute the establishment of a standard that establishes generally
applicable requirements.
VIII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact
Pursuant to Section 121(c) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, this
proposed rule does not require the preparation of an environmental
impact statement under Section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 or any environmental review under subparagraph (E)
or (F) of Section 102(2) of such act.
IX. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
The information collection requirements contained in this proposed
rule of limited applicability affect one respondent, which is a federal
entity. Therefore, Office of Management and Budget approval is not
required pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3501 et seq.).
X. Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a request for information or an information collection
requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid
OMB control number.
XI. Regulatory Analysis
The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis on this
proposed regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of
the alternatives considered by the Commission.
The Commission requests public comment on the draft regulatory
analysis. Comments on the draft analysis may be submitted to the NRC as
indicated under the ADDRESSES heading. The analysis is available for
inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, 11555 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, MD 20852.
XII. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C.
605(b)), the Commission certifies that this rule would not, if
promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number
of small entities. This proposed rule affects only the licensing of one
entity, the DOE, which does not fall within the scope of the definition
of ``small entities'' set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or
the size standards established by the NRC (10 CFR 2.810).
XIII. Backfit Analysis
The NRC has determined that the backfit rule (Sec. Sec. 50.109,
70.76, 72.62, or 76.76) does not apply to this proposed rule because
this amendment would not involve any provisions that would impose
backfits as defined in 10 CFR Chapter I. Therefore, a backfit analysis
is not required.
List of Subjects
10 CFR Part 60
Criminal penalties, High-level waste, Nuclear materials, Nuclear
power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Waste treatment and disposal.
10 CFR Part 63
Criminal penalties, High-level waste, Nuclear power plants and
reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Waste treatment and
disposal.
10 CFR Part 73
Criminal penalties, Export, Hazardous materials transportation,
Import, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.
10 CFR Part 74
Accounting, Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation,
Material control and accounting, Nuclear materials, Packaging and
containers, Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Scientific equipment, Special nuclear material.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552; the NRC is proposing to
adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR parts 60, 63, 73, and 74:
PART 60--DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN GEOLOGIC
REPOSITORIES
1. The authority citation for part 60 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 62, 63, 65, 81, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat.
929, 930, 932, 933, 935, 948, 953, 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071,
2073, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233); secs. 202, 206, 88
Stat. 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5842, 5846); secs. 10 and 14, Pub. L.
95-601, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 2021a and 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L.
91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 114, 121, Pub. L. 97-
425, 96 Stat. 2213g, 2228, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10134, 10141), and
Pub. L. 102-486, sec. 2902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851); sec.
1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note).
2. In Sec. 60.21, paragraphs (b)(3) and (b)(4) are revised to read
as follows:
Sec. 60.21 Content of application.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) A description of the security measures for physical protection
of high-level radioactive waste and other radioactive material in
accordance with Sec. 73.53 of this chapter. This description must
include a description of the design for physical protection, the
safeguards contingency plan, and security organization personnel
training and qualification plan. The description must list tests,
inspections, audits, and other
[[Page 72534]]
means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such requirements.
(4) A description of the material control and accounting program to
meet the requirements of Sec. Sec. 74.11, 74.13, 74.15, 74.17, 74.71,
and 74.73 of this chapter.
* * * * *
3. In Sec. 60.24, paragraph (d) is added to read as follows:
Sec. 60.24 Updating of application and environmental impact
statement.
* * * * *
(d) DOE shall supplement its application no later than 180 days
after the NRC issues a construction authorization for the GROA with the
submittal of the following plans:
(1) Physical Security Plan;
(2) Training and Qualification Plan;
(3) Safeguards Contingency Plan; and
(4) Material Control and Accounting Plan.
4. Section 60.78 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 60.78 Criticality reporting.
(a) DOE shall notify the NRC Operations Center \3\ within one hour
of discovery of any case of accidental criticality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Commercial telephone number of the NRC Operations Center is
(301) 816-5100.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) This notification must be made to the NRC Operations Center via
the Emergency Notification System if DOE is party to that system. If
the Emergency Notification System is inoperative or unavailable, DOE
shall make the required notification via commercial telephonic service
or other dedicated telephonic system or any other method that will
ensure that a report is received by the NRC Operations Center within
one hour.
PART 63--DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN A GEOLOGIC
REPOSITORY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NEVADA
5. The authority citation for part 63 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 62, 63, 65, 81, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat.
929, 930, 932, 933, 935, 948, 953, 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071,
2073, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233); secs. 202, 206, 88
Stat. 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5842, 5846); secs. 10 and 14, Pub. L.
95-601, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 2021a and 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L.
91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 114, 121, Pub. L. 97-
425, 96 Stat. 2213g, 2238, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10134, 10141), and
Pub. L. 102-486, sec. 2902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851); sec.
1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note).
6. In Sec. 63.21, paragraphs (b)(3) and (b)(4) are revised to read
as follows:
Sec. 63.21 Content of application.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) A description of the security measures for physical protection
of high-level radioactive waste and other radioactive material in
accordance with Sec. 73.53 of this chapter. This description must
include the description of the design for physical protection, the
safeguards contingency plan, and security organization personnel
training and qualification plan. The description must list tests,
inspections, audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate
compliance with such requirements.
(4) A description of the material control and accounting program to
meet the requirements of Sec. Sec. 74.11, 74.13, 74.15, 74.17, 74.71,
and 74.73 of this chapter.
* * * * *
7. In Sec. 63.24, paragraph (d) is added to read as follows:
Sec. 63.24 Updating of application and environmental impact
statement.
* * * * *
(d) DOE shall supplement its application no later than 180 days
after the NRC issues a construction authorization for the GROA with the
submittal of the following plans:
(1) Physical Security Plan;
(2) Training and Qualification Plan;
(3) Safeguards Contingency Plan; and
(4) Material Control and Accounting Plan.
8. Section 63.78 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 63.78 Criticality reporting.
(a) DOE shall notify the NRC Operations Center\3\ within one hour
of discovery of any case of accidental criticality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Commercial telephone number of the NRC Operations Center is
(301) 816-5100
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) This notification must be made to the NRC Operations Center via
the Emergency Notification System if DOE is party to that system. If
the Emergency Notification System is inoperative or unavailable, DOE
shall make the required notification via commercial telephonic service
or other dedicated telephonic system or any other method that will
ensure that a report is received by the NRC Operations Center within
one hour.
9. Section 63.161 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 63.161 Emergency plan for the geologic repository operations
area through permanent closure.
DOE shall develop and be prepared to implement a plan to provide
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be
taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the geologic
repository operations area, at any time before permanent closure and
decontamination or decontamination and dismantlement of surface
facilities. The emergency plan must be based on the criteria of Sec.
72.32(b) of this chapter.
PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
10. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec.
147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as
amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245, sec. 1701, 106 Stat.
2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844, 2297f); sec. 1704, 112 Stat.
2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note).
Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425,
96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C, 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also
issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841
note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-399, 100
Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169) and under sec. 652, Pub. L. 109-58, 119
Stat. 810 (42 U.S.C. 2169).
11. In Sec. 73.2, definitions for ``high-level radioactive waste''
and ``target set for a geologic repository operations area'' are added
in alphabetical order to read as follows:
Sec. 73.2 Definitions.
* * * * *
High-level radioactive waste or HLW means:
(1) The highly radioactive material resulting from the reprocessing
of spent nuclear fuel, including liquid waste produced directly in
reprocessing and any solid material derived from such liquid waste that
contains fission products in sufficient concentrations;
(2) Irradiated reactor fuel; and
(3) Other highly radioactive material that the Commission,
consistent with existing law, determines by rule requires permanent
isolation.
* * * * *
Target set for a geologic repository operations area means the
combination of equipment or operator actions which, if all are
prevented from performing their intended safety function or prevented
from being accomplished, would likely result in significant operational
disruption or radiological contamination barring extraordinary action
by site operators. For a geological repository operations area (GROA),
a target set means quantities and form of high-level radioactive waste
and other radioactive material and the protective and mitigative
measures to protect against potential large scale releases of
[[Page 72535]]
fission products from malevolent actions.
* * * * *
12. In Sec. 73.50, the introductory paragraph is revised to read
as follows:
Sec. 73.50 Requirements for physical protection of licensed
activities.
Each licensee who is not subject to Sec. Sec. 73.51 or 73.53, but
who possesses, uses, or stores formula quantities of strategic special
nuclear material that are not readily separable from other radioactive
material and which have total external radiation dose rates in excess
of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible
surfaces without intervening shielding other than at a nuclear reactor
facility licensed pursuant to part 50 of this chapter, shall comply
with the following:
* * * * *
13. In Sec. 73.51, the heading is revised and paragraph (a) is
revised to read as follows:
Sec. 73.51 Requirements for physical protection of stored spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
(a) Applicability. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sec. Sec.
73.20, 73.50, or 73.67, the physical protection requirements of this
section apply to each licensee that stores spent nuclear fuel and high-
level radioactive waste pursuant to paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of this
section. This includes spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
waste stored under a specific license issued pursuant to part 72 of
this chapter:
(1) At an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) or
(2) At a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) installation.
* * * * *
14. Section 73.53 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 73.53 Requirements for physical protection of a geologic
repository operations area.
(a) Applicability. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sec. Sec.
73.20, 73.50, or 73.67, the physical protection requirements of this
section apply to DOE for its activities at the geologic repository
operations area (GROA) pursuant to a license issued under Part 60 or 63
of this chapter.
(b) Submittal and implementation dates. (1) DOE shall submit a
Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards
Contingency Plan that delineate how the requirements of this section
will be met. The security plans must be submitted no later than 180
days after the NRC issues a construction authorization for the GROA.
The Commission-approved security plans must be implemented upon the
Commission's issuance of a license to receive and possess source,
special nuclear, or byproduct material at the GROA or by the date
specified in a license condition.
(2) DOE is exempt from the requirements of this section after
permanent closure of the GROA.
(c) Performance objectives--(1) General. DOE shall establish,
implement, and maintain an onsite physical protection program and
security organization which will have as its objective to provide high
assurance that activities involving radioactive waste are not inimical
to the common defense and security and do not constitute an
unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.
(2) Radioactive waste containing strategic special nuclear
material. For formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material,
DOE shall establish and maintain, or make arrangements for, a physical
protection system designed to detect, assess, intercept, challenge,
delay, and neutralize security-related events specified for theft or
diversion of strategic special nuclear material and radiological
sabotage as stated in Sec. 73.1(a).
(3) Radioactive waste not containing strategic special nuclear
material. (i) For radioactive material that could result in a
significant radiological sabotage event releasing radioactive materials
in sufficient quantity such that any individual located at the
controlled area boundary, or 400 meters (1300 ft), whichever is less,
could receive a total effective dose equivalent equal to or greater
than 0.25 Sv (25 rem), DOE shall establish and maintain, or make
arrangements for, a physical protection system designed to detect,
assess, intercept, challenge, delay and neutralize security-related
events specified for radiological sabotage as stated in Sec.
73.1(a)(1).
(ii) For radioactive material that could result in a moderate
radiological sabotage event releasing radioactive materials in
sufficient quantity such that any individual located at the controlled
area boundary, or 400 meters (1300 ft), whichever is less, could
receive a total effective dose equivalent equal to or greater than 0.05
Sv (5 rem) but less than 0.25 Sv (25 rem), DOE shall establish and
maintain, or make arrangements for, a physical protection system
designed to detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay and neutralize,
impede, or mitigate security-related events specified for radiological
sabotage. DOE must protect against an adversary force that is well-
trained (including military training and skills) and contains dedicated
individuals. The adversary force may include assistance from an inside
knowledgeable individual participating in a passive role (e.g., provide
information), an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit,
disable alarms and communications, participate in violent attack), or
both. The adversary force may be armed with suitable weapons, up to and
including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and
having effective long range accuracy, and be equipped with hand-carried
equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as
tools of entry or for otherwise destroying the facility, transporter,
or container integrity or features of the safeguards system. The
adversary force may use a four-wheel drive land vehicle used for
transporting personnel and their hand-carried equipment or land vehicle
bomb to the proximity of vital areas.
(iii) For all other radioactive material containing special nuclear
material, DOE shall establish and maintain, or make arrangements for, a
physical protection system designed to detect, assess, intercept,
challenge, delay, and prevent the removal of special nuclear material
from the protected area for security-related events specified for theft
or diversion. DOE must protect against an adversary force that is well-
trained (including military training and skills) and contains dedicated
individuals. The adversary force may include assistance from an inside
knowledgeable individual participating in a passive role (e.g., provide
information), an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit,
disable alarms and communications, participate in violent attack), or
both. The adversary force may be armed with suitable weapons, up to and
including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and
having effective long range accuracy, and be equipped with hand-carried
equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as
tools of entry or for otherwise destroying the facility, transporter,
or container integrity or features of the safeguards system. The
adversary force may use a four-wheel drive land vehicle used for
transporting personnel and their hand-carried equipment or land vehicle
bomb to the proximity of vital areas.
(iv) For other solidified radioactive material and Appendix P to
part 110--Category 1 and 2 Radioactive Material, DOE shall establish
and maintain or make arrangements for a physical protection system
designed to:
[[Page 72536]]
(A) Minimize the possibilities for unauthorized access to the
radioactive material;
(B) Prevent or impede the removal of the radioactive material from
the controlled area;
(C) Facilitate the location and prompt recovery of lost, stolen, or
missing radioactive material; and
(D) Mitigate potential consequences of such security-related
events.
(d) General requirements. DOE shall:
(1) Design and implement the physical protection program to satisfy
the performance requirements of this section and ensure that no single
act can disable the personnel, equipment, or systems necessary to
prevent the theft of strategic special nuclear material and significant
radiological sabotage. The physical protection program must include
diverse and redundant equipment, systems, technology, programs,
supporting processes, and implementing procedures;
(2) Establish and maintain a written performance evaluation program
in accordance with Appendix B and Appendix C to this part, to
demonstrate and assess the effectiveness of armed responders and armed
security officers to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities
to protect target sets described in paragraph (h) of this section and
Appendix C to this part, through implementation of the DOE protective
strategy. Except, the requirement for annual force-on-force exercises
only applies to formula quantities of strategic special nuclear
material and significant radiological sabotage consequence target sets;
(3) Establish, maintain, and follow an access authorization program
for protected and vital areas that meets the requirements of Sec.
73.56a and Sec. 73.57;
(4) Develop, implement, and maintain an insider mitigation program.
The insider mitigation program must be designed to oversee and monitor
the initial and continuing trustworthiness and reliability of
individuals granted or retaining unescorted access authorization to a
protected or vital area and implement defense-in-depth methodologies to
minimize the potential for an insider to adversely affect, either
directly or indirectly, DOE capability to prevent theft, diversion, and
radiological sabotage of high-level radioactive waste; and
(5) Ensure that its corrective action program assures that
failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective equipment,
and nonconformances in security program components, functions, or
personnel are promptly identified and corrected. Measures shall ensure
that the cause of any of these conditions is determined and that
corrective action is taken to preclude repetition.
(e) Security plans. DOE shall:
(1) Develop security plans that implement Commission requirements
and that identify:
(i) How the physical protection program will prevent the theft or
diversion and radiological sabotage of special nuclear and byproduct
materials through the establishment and maintenance of a security
organization, the use of security equipment and technology, the
training and qualification of security personnel, and the
implementation of predetermined response plans and strategies; and
(ii) Site-specific conditions that affect implementation of
Commission requirements.
(2) Protect the security plans and other related safeguards
information against unauthorized disclosure in accordance with the
requirements of Sec. 73.21 or Executive Order 12958, as appropriate.
(3) Establish, implement, and maintain written procedures that
document the structure of the security organization, detail the
specific duties and responsibilities of each position, and implement
Commission requirements through the approved security plans.
Implementing procedures must detail the specific actions to be taken
and decisions to be made by each position of the security organization
to implement the approved security plans.
(4) Develop, implement, and maintain a process for DOE's written
approval of implementing procedures and revisions to those procedures.
The process shall ensure that implementing procedures and revisions to
the procedures do not decrease the effectiveness of the security plans.
(5) Revise approved security plans as necessary to ensure the
effective implementation of Commission regulations and DOE's protective
strategy. Commission approval of revisions made pursuant to this
paragraph is not required, provided that the revisions make no change
that would decrease the effectiveness of any security plan prepared
pursuant to this section. DOE shall submit a report containing a
description of each change within six months after the change is made.
DOE shall submit any change that decreases the effectiveness of any
security plan for NRC approval pursuant to Sec. Sec. 60.45 or 63.45 of
this chapter.
(6) Establish, implement, and maintain a Commission-approved
physical security plan that identifies how the performance objective
and requirements set forth in this section will be implemented. The
physical security plan must describe the facility location and layout;
the security organization and structure; duties and responsibilities of
personnel; and defense-in-depth implementation that describes
components, equipment, and technology used. The physical security plan
must include an assessment of radiological sabotage security events
against the radiological dose criteria to determine the appropriate
protective strategy for identified target sets described in paragraph
(h) of this section.
(7) Establish, maintain, and follow a Commission-approved training
and qualification plan that identifies how the criteria set forth in
Appendix B, ``General Criteria for Security Personnel,'' Section VII,
to this part will be implemented. The training and qualification plan
must describe the process by which armed and unarmed security
personnel, watch persons, and other members of the security
organization will be selected, trained, equipped, tested, qualified,
and requalified to ensure that these individuals possess and maintain
the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to carry out their
assigned duties and responsibilities effectively.
(8) Establish, implement, and maintain a Commission-approved
safeguards contingency plan that describes how the criteria set forth
in Appendix C, ``Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans,'' Section III,
to this part will be implemented. The safeguards contingency plan must
describe predetermined actions, plans, and strategies designed to
respond to security related events.
(f) Security organization. DOE:
(1) Shall establish and maintain a security organization designed,
staffed, trained, and equipped to provide early detection, assessment,
and response to unauthorized activities within any area of the
facility. The security organization must include:
(i) A management system that provides oversight of the onsite
physical protection program; and
(ii) At least one member, onsite and available at all times, who
has the authority to direct the activities of the security organization
and who is assigned no other duties that would interfere with this
individual's ability to perform these duties in accordance with the
approved security plans and licensee's protective strategy.
(2) Shall not permit any individual to act as a member of the
security organization unless the individual has been trained, equipped,
and qualified to
[[Page 72537]]
perform assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with the
requirements of Appendix B, Section VII, to this part and the
Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
(3) Shall not assign an individual to any position involving
detection, assessment, or response to unauthorized activities unless
that individual has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 73.56a.
(4) Shall ensure that any written agreement with any contractor
used to implement the onsite physical protection program must be
retained as a record for the duration of the contract, and the
agreement must clearly state the following conditions:
(i) DOE is responsible to the Commission for maintaining the
physical protection program in accordance with Commission orders,
Commission regulations, and the approved security plans;
(ii) The Commission may inspect, copy, retain, and remove all
reports and documents required to be kept by Commission regulations,
orders, or applicable license conditions whether the reports and
documents are kept by DOE or the contractor;
(iii) An individual may not be assigned to any position involving
detection, assessment, or response to unauthorized activities unless
that individual has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 73.56a;
(iv) An individual may not be assigned duties and responsibilities
required to implement the approved security plans or DOE protective
strategy unless that individual has been properly trained, equipped,
and qualified to perform his or her assigned duties and
responsibilities in accordance with Appendix B, Section VII, to this
part and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan; and
(v) Upon the request of an authorized representative of the
Commission, the contractor security employees shall demonstrate the
ability to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities
effectively.
(g) Physical barriers. DOE shall establish and maintain physical
barriers in the controlled area to deter, delay, or prevent
unauthorized access; facilitate the early detection of unauthorized
activities; and control approach routes to the facility. Based upon
DOE's protective strategy, analyses, and site conditions that affect
the use and placement of physical barriers, DOE shall install and
maintain physical barriers that are designed and constructed as
necessary to deter, delay, and prevent the introduction of unauthorized
personnel, vehicles, or materials into areas for which access must be
controlled or restricted.
(1) DOE shall describe in the approved security plans, the design,
construction, and function of physical barriers and barrier systems
used and shall ensure that each barrier and barrier system is designed
and constructed to satisfy the stated function of the barrier and
barrier system.
(2) DOE shall retain in accordance with Sec. 73.70, all analyses,
comparisons, and descriptions of the physical barriers and barrier
systems used to satisfy the requirements of this section, and shall
protect these records as safeguards information in accordance with the
requirements of Sec. 73.21.
(3) Physical barriers must:
(i) Clearly delineate the boundaries of the area(s) for which the
physical barrier provides protection or a function, such as protected
and vital area boundaries and standoff distance;
(ii) Be designed and constructed to protect against security-
related events as specified by the Commission, commensurate to the
required function of each barrier and in support of the DOE's
protective strategy;
(iii) Provide visual deterrence, delay, and support access control
measures; and
(iv) Support effective implementation of DOE's protective strategy.
(4) Isolation zone. (i) An isolation zone must be maintained in
outdoor areas adjacent to the protected area perimeter barrier. The
isolation zone shall be:
(A) Designed and of sufficient size, typically 6.1 m (20 feet)
wide, to permit unobstructed observation and assessment of activities
on either side of the protected area barrier; and
(B) Equipped with intrusion detection equipment capable of
detecting both attempted and actual penetration of the protected area
perimeter barrier and assessment equipment capable of facilitating
timely evaluation of the detected unauthorized activities before
completed penetration of the protected area perimeter barrier.
(ii) Assessment equipment in the isolation zone must provide real-
time and play-back/recorded video images in a manner that allows timely
evaluation of any detected unauthorized activities before and after
each alarm annunciation.
(iii) Parking facilities, storage areas, or other obstructions that
could provide concealment or otherwise interfere with the DOE's
capability to meet the requirements of paragraphs (g)(5)(i)(A) and
(g)(5)(i)(B) must be located outside of the isolation zone.
(5) Protected area. (i) The protected area perimeter must be
protected by physical barriers designed and constructed to meet
Commission requirements, and all penetrations through this barrier must
be secured in a manner that prevents or delays and detects the
exploitation of any penetration.
(ii) The protected area perimeter physical barriers must be
separated from any other barrier designated as a vital area physical
barrier, unless otherwise identified in the approved physical security
plan.
(iii) All emergency exits in the protected area must be secured by
locking devices that allow exit only and are alarmed.
(iv) The central alarm station and the location, within which the
last access control function for access to the protected area is
performed, must be bullet-resisting.
(v) All exterior areas within the protected area must be
periodically checked to detect and deter unauthorized activities,
personnel, vehicles, and materials.
(6) Vital areas. (i) Vital equipment must be located only within
vital areas, which in turn must be located within protected areas so
that access to vital equipment requires passage through at least two
physical barriers designed and constructed to perform the required
function, except as otherwise approved by the Commission in accordance
with paragraph (h)(3) of this section.
(ii) More than one vital area may be located within a single
protected area.
(iii) Secondary power supply systems for intrusion detection and
assessment equipment, nonportable communications equipment, and the
alarm stations, must be provided protection equivalent to vital
equipment located within a vital area.
(iv) Vital equipment that is undergoing maintenance or is out of
service, or any other change to site conditions that could adversely
affect plant safety or security, must be identified in accordance with
paragraph (t) of this section, and adjustments must be made to the site
protective strategy, site procedures, and approved security plans, as
necessary.
(v) DOE shall protect all vital areas, vital area access portals,
and vital area emergency exits with intrusion detection equipment and
locking devices. Emergency exit locking devices shall be designed to
permit exit only.
(vi) Unoccupied vital areas must be locked.
(7) Vehicle barrier system. DOE must:
(i) Prevent unauthorized vehicle access or proximity to any area
from
[[Page 72538]]
which any vehicle, its personnel, or its contents could disable the
personnel, equipment, or systems necessary to meet the performance
objectives and requirements described in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this
section, as appropriate;
(ii) Limit and control all vehicle approach routes;
(iii) Design and install a vehicle barrier system, to include
passive and active barriers, at a standoff distance adequate to protect
personnel, equipment, and systems against security-related events as
specified by Commission requirements;
(iv) Deter, detect, delay, or prevent vehicle use as a means of
transporting unauthorized personnel or materials to gain unauthorized
access beyond a vehicle barrier system, gain proximity to a protected
area or vital area, or otherwise penetrate the protected area
perimeter;
(v) Periodically check the operation of active vehicle barriers and
provide a secondary power source or a means of mechanical or manual
operation, in the event of a power failure, to ensure that the active
barrier can be placed in the denial position within the time line
required to prevent unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required
standoff distance; and
(vi) Provide surveillance and observation of vehicle barriers and
barrier systems to detect unauthorized activities and to ensure the
integrity of each vehicle barrier and barrier system.
(8) Unattended openings. Unattended openings in any barrier
established to meet the requirements of this section that are 620 cm\2\
(96.1 in\2\) or greater in total area and have a smallest dimension of
15 cm (5.9 in) or greater, must be secured and monitored at a frequency
that would prevent exploitation of the opening consistent with the
intended function of each barrier.
(h) Target sets. DOE shall:
(1) Document in site procedures the process used to develop and
identify target sets, to include analyses and methodologies used to
determine and group the target set equipment or elements.
(2) Consider the effects that cyber attacks may have upon
individual equipment or elements of each target set or grouping.
(3) Explicitly identify in the approved security plans any target
set equipment or elements that are not contained within a protected or
vital area. Protective measures for such equipment or elements must be
addressed by DOE's protective strategy in accordance with Appendix C to
this part.
(4) Implement a program for the oversight of plant equipment and
systems documented as part of DOE's protective strategy to ensure that
changes to the configuration of the identified equipment and systems do
not compromise DOE's capability to prevent or mitigate radiological
sabotage.
(i) Access control. DOE shall establish an access control program
with the features described in paragraphs (i)(1) through (i)(8) of this
section.
(1) General. DOE shall:
(i) Control all points of personnel, vehicle, and material access
into any area, or beyond any physical barrier or barrier system,
established to meet the requirements of this section;
(ii) Control all points of personnel and vehicle access into vital
areas in accordance with access authorization lists;
(iii) During nonemergency conditions, limit unescorted access to
the protected area and vital areas to only those individuals who
require unescorted access to perform assigned duties and
responsibilities;
(iv) Monitor and ensure the integrity of access control systems;
(v) Provide supervision and control over the badging process to
prevent unauthorized bypass of control equipment located at or outside
of the protected area;
(vi) Isolate the individual responsible for the last control
function (controlling admission to the protected area) within a bullet-
resisting structure to assure the ability to respond or to summon
assistance in response to unauthorized activities; and
(vii) In response to a specific threat and security information,
implement a two (2) person (line-of-sight) rule for all personnel in
vital areas so that no one individual is permitted unescorted access to
vital areas. Under these conditions, DOE shall implement measures to
verify that the two-person rule has been met when a vital area is
accessed.
(2) Confirmation, verification, and search. In accordance with the
approved security plans and before granting unescorted access through
an access control point, DOE shall:
(i) Confirm the identity of individuals;
(ii) Verify the authorization for access of individuals, vehicles,
and materials; and
(iii) Search individuals, vehicles, packages, deliveries, and
materials in accordance with paragraph (j) of this section.
(3) Access control points. Access control points must be:
(i) Equipped with locking devices, intrusion detection equipment,
and monitoring, observation, and surveillance equipment, as
appropriate; and
(ii) Located outside or concurrent with, the physical barrier
system through which it controls access.
(4) Emergency conditions. DOE shall:
(i) Design the access control system to accommodate the potential
need for rapid ingress or egress of authorized individuals during
emergency conditions or situations that could lead to emergency
conditions;
(ii) Under emergency conditions, implement procedures to ensure
that:
(A) Authorized emergency personnel are provided prompt access to
affected areas and equipment;
(B) Attempted or actual unauthorized entry to vital equipment is
detected; and
(C) The capability to prevent or mitigate radiological sabotage is
maintained.
(iii) Ensure that restrictions for site access and egress during
emergency conditions are coordinated with responses by emergency
support organizations identified in the emergency plans required by
Sec. 60.21(c)(9) or Sec. 63.161 of this chapter.
(5) Vehicles. (i) DOE shall exercise control over all vehicles
while inside the protected area and vital areas to ensure that they are
used only by authorized persons and for authorized purposes.
(ii) Vehicles inside the protected area or vital areas must be
operated by an individual authorized unescorted access to the area, or
must be escorted by an individual trained, qualified, and equipped to
perform vehicle escort duties, while inside the area.
(iii) Vehicles inside the protected area must be limited to
facility functions or emergencies, and must be disabled when not in
use.
(iv) Vehicles transporting hazardous materials inside the protected
area must be escorted by an armed member of the security organization.
(6) Access control devices--(i) Identification badges. DOE shall
implement a numbered photo identification badge/key-card system for all
individuals authorized unescorted access to the protected area and
vital areas.
(A) Identification badges may be removed from the protected area
only when measures are in place to confirm the true identity and
authorization for unescorted access of the badge holder before allowing
unescorted access to the protected area.
(B) Except where operational safety concerns require otherwise,
[[Page 72539]]
identification badges must be clearly displayed by all individuals
while inside the protected area and vital areas.
(C) DOE shall maintain a record, to include the name and areas to
which unescorted access is granted, of all individuals to whom photo
identification badge/key-cards have been issued.
(ii) Keys, locks, combinations, and passwords. All keys, locks,
combinations, passwords, and related access control devices used to
control access to protected areas, vital areas, security systems, and
safeguards information must be controlled and accounted for to reduce
the probability of compromise. DOE shall:
(A) Issue access control devices only to individuals who require
unescorted access to perform official duties and responsibilities;
(B) Maintain a record, to include name and affiliation, of all
individuals to whom access control devices have been issued, and
implement a process to account for access control devices at least
annually;
(C) Implement compensatory measures upon discovery or suspicion
that any access control device may have been compromised. Compensatory
measures must remain in effect until the compromise is corrected;
(D) Retrieve, change, rotate, deactivate, or otherwise disable
access control devices that have been, or may have been, compromised;
and
(E) Retrieve, change, rotate, deactivate, or otherwise disable all
access control devices issued to individuals who no longer require
unescorted access to the areas for which the devices were designed.
(7) Visitors. (i) DOE may permit escorted access to the protected
area to individuals who do not have unescorted access authorization in
accordance with the requirements of Sec. 73.56a of this part and part
26 of this chapter. DOE shall:
(A) Implement procedures for processing, escorting, and controlling
visitors;
(B) Confirm the identity of each visitor through physical
presentation of a recognized identification card issued by a local,
State, or Federal Government agency that includes a photo or contains
physical characteristics of the individual requesting escorted access;
(C) Maintain a visitor control register in which all visitors shall
register their name, date, time, purpose of visit, employment
affiliation, citizenship, and name of the individual to be visited
before being escorted into any protected or vital area;
(D) Issue a visitor badge to all visitors that clearly indicates
that an escort is required; and
(E) Escort all visitors, at all times, while inside the protected
area and vital areas.
(ii) Individuals not employed by DOE, but who require frequent and
extended unescorted access to the protected area and vital areas, shall
satisfy the access authorization requirements of Sec. 73.56a and part
26 of this chapter and shall be issued a nonemployee photo
identification badge that is easily distinguished from other
identification badges before being allowed unescorted access to the
protected area. Nonemployee photo identification badges must indicate:
(A) Nonemployee, no escort required;
(B) Areas to which access is authorized;
(C) The period for which access is authorized;
(D) The individual's employer; and
(E) A means to determine the individual's emergency plan assembly
area.
(8) Escorts. DOE shall ensure that all escorts are trained in
accordance with Section VII of Appendix B to this part, the approved
training and qualification plan, and DOE policies and procedures.
(i) Escorts shall be authorized unescorted access to all areas in
which they will perform escort duties.
(ii) Individuals assigned to escort visitors shall be provided a
means of timely communication with both alarm stations in a manner that
ensures the ability to summon assistance when needed.
(iii) Individuals assigned to vehicle escort duties s